A single creditor filed an involuntary chapter 7 petition against debtor, indicating that debtor had fewer than 12 holders of non-contingent claims. On debtor's motion asserting that it had approximately 150 creditors, the court allowed creditor time to amend its petition to add at least 2 more creditors, which it did. Superseded non-judicially appointed trustee for debtor requested that the court clarify whether the commencement date of the bankruptcy was the filing date of the single creditor petition, or the date the amended petition was filed. The court determined, first, that the 3-petitioning creditor requirement was not jurisdictional. The court then applied a version of the good faith test to creditor's initial petition, which required it to consider both creditor's pre-filing inquiry and its subjective purpose for filing, on which debtor bears the burden of proving bad faith. Finally, the court determined that, since the initial petition was not insufficient on its face and was not filed in bad faith, the defect in the initial petition was cured either by the other creditors' filing of their own involuntary petition, or by the filing of an amended petition that named all 3 creditors, and that the joinder related back to the initial filing date.

Debtors filed a previous chapter 7 petition that was dismissed by the court based on debtors' failure to appear at the creditors meeting, which debtors explained was due to inadvertently writing down the wrong date. They filed a new petition shortly after the dismissal was entered, and creditor moved to dismiss their petition on the grounds that they were precluded from refiling by 11 U.S.C. § 109(f)(1). That provision precludes refiling for 180 days after a previous filing was dismissed for "willful failure" to abide by the court's orders or to appear before the court in proper prosecution of their case. The court ruled that failure to appear at the creditors meeting satisfied both situations covered by § 109(f)(1), and thus considered whether debtors' failure to appear had been willful, which standard the court determined was applicable to both § 109(f)(1) situations. The court decided that "willful" in this context should be defined the same as it is under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), or "deliberate or intentional," found that debtors had presented credible testimony that their failure to appear was not deliberate or intentional, and ruled that § 109(f)(1) was inapplicable.

Prior to the filing of an involuntary chapter 11 petition against it, debtor's officers and employees personally incurred business expenses on debtor's behalf. Postpetition, those employees were subjected to collection efforts, and debtor requested that the court extend the automatic stay to its present officers and employees with respect to those debts. Noting that the Bankruptcy Code does not provide a stay for non-debtor codefendants, the court determined that the sole basis upon which the collection efforts against debtor's employees could be enjoined was the court's injunction power under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). The court held that, in extraordinary cases and under limited circumstances, § 105(a) may be necessary and appropriate to effect the objectives of bankruptcy. The court identified three considerations relevant to the use of its injunctive power from case law, and concluded that debtor had made enough of a case to warrant a very limited stay, so that its officers and employees could devote themselves to the reorganization effort.

Chapter 11 debtor's counsel issued a letter to all creditors, asking for their input regarding five potential "plans" that would result in dismissal of the bankruptcy. The letter attached exhibits, including appraisals of debtor's properties, debtor's estimates of costs, and various payout provisions for secured and unsecured creditors. Trustee filed a contempt motion asserting that the communication was an unauthorized solicitation of plan votes that violated 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b), and that debtor's attorney had inappropriately had direct contact with creditors who were represented by counsel. The court ruled that "solicitation" must be narrowly construed, and that debtor's communication, which was not a specific request for official votes, was not an unauthorized solicitation under § 1125(b). However, the court further ruled that debtor's attorney's direct communication with creditors without obtaining their attorneys' permission was a violation of Utah's Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1), and the attorney was reprimanded, but was not required to bear the costs of the proceedings.