Untimely filed proof of claim was disallowed. Creditor was required to file a proof of claim by the claims bar date under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c). Motion for relief from stay was not a proof of claim or an informal proof of claim to which the untimely-filed proof of claim could relate back. Such motions rarely serve as an informal proof of claim under the factors in Clark v. Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. (In re Reliance Equities, Inc.), 966 F.2d 1338, 1345 (10th Cir. 1992). Additionally, the claims bar date could not be extended for “excusable neglect” under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1)(A) as interpreted in Pioneer Invest. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993). Court notes that excusable neglect standard may no longer apply because of amendments made to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c)(7) and 3003(c)(3) after Pioneer was decided.
You are here
Opinions
The District of Utah offers a database of opinions for the years 1979 to Current, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
Opinion Archive
Click here to view the Court's Opinions in reverse Chronological order.
Title: In re Plaza 106, LLC | Date: Jun-3-2026 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Peggy Hunt) | Case(s): 25-25459
Title: In re Michel | Date: Apr-1-2026 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Peggy Hunt) | Case(s): 25-22542
Chapter 13 Trustee’s objection to confirmation of proposed plan was sustained. The plan did not comply with the best interests of creditors test under 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(4) because it provided no distribution to general unsecured creditors whereas a distribution would be made in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case based on equity in the debtor’s homestead. Only the debtor, who held title to the property, could claim a homestead exemption under Utah Code § 78B-5-503(2). His non-debtor spouse, who was not on title, could not claim an exemption because she was not an “owner” as required under § 78B-5-503(2)(b). Equitable interests in property may establish ownership, but only if a cognizable legal interest exists. Possession of property, without more, is not sufficient to establish ownership under Utah law.
Title: In re Carter | Date: Oct-26-2025 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Peggy Hunt) | Case(s): 24-22514
Debtors sought to modify their confirmed Chapter 13 plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1329 of the Bankruptcy Code to surrender a vehicle for the secured creditor to sell, with liquidation proceeds applied to the creditor’s claim and the deficiency claim treated as a general unsecured claim. Under the confirmed plan, the debtors had planned to retain and pay for the vehicle pursuant to the parties’ prepetition contracts. The Trustee objected to the modification motion, arguing that modification of the debtors’ confirmed Plan was not fair to the creditor because the creditor’s unpaid unsecured claim that was to have been paid in full would now be crammed down and discharged. The Court concluded that the post-confirmation modification was permissible because it was within the express terms of § 1329(a)(3) and, alternatively, was permitted under the plain language of § 1329(a)(1) and (a)(2).
Title: In re Correa | Date: Jun-10-2025 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Peggy Hunt) | Case(s): 24-25099
Debtors claimed a homestead exemption in their towable travel trailer, asserting it was a “mobile home” under the Utah Exemptions Act, Utah Code § 78B-5-503. The Trustee objected, contending that the towable travel trailer was not a “mobile home” as defined in Utah’s Motor Vehicle Act and various municipal ordinances. Relying on the statutory definition of a “mobile home” under the Utah Exemptions Act, which the Utah Legislature tethered to the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act, Utah Code § 57-16-3(4), the Court determined that the debtors’ towable travel trailer did constitute a “mobile home” and was therefore entitled to an exemption under the Utah Exemptions Act.
Title: In re Gasperini | Date: May-28-2025 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Peggy Hunt) | Case(s): 25-21528
The Chapter 13 debtors filed a motion to impose the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 362(c)(4)(A)(i). The debtors had two Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases dismissed in the previous year and were not entitled to the protection of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 362(c)(4)(A). The Credit Union objected, claiming that the debtors failed to demonstrate good faith under 11 U.S.C § 362(c)(4)(B) and could not propose a feasible plan. Thereafter, the Credit Union’s Objection was resolved through a settlement agreement reached with the debtor. In determining whether the case was filed in good faith and whether the automatic stay should apply to all creditors, the Court relied on (1) the Galanis factors, extending the application of the factors to 11 U.S.C § 362(c)(4)(B) rather than just to 11 U.S.C § 362(c)(3)(B) as the factors have previously been applied, and (2) subsections (II) and (III) of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i). Using these factors to evaluate the totality of the circumstances test, including consideration of the debtors’ increased income, the Court imposed the automatic stay on all creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 362(c)(3)(B) and determined that the case was not filed in bad faith.
Title: In re Mohammed | Date: May-15-2025 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Peggy Hunt) | Case(s): 25-21265
Pro Se Chapter 13 debtor filed a motion for relief and reconsideration from an order denying motion to vacate dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. Debtor’s voluntary Chapter 13 petition had been dismissed for failure to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 109(h). Under § 109(h), debtor was not eligible to be a debtor because she had not obtained prepetition credit-counseling as required under § 109(h)(1), made a counseling extension request as allowed by § 109(h)(3), or shown any basis to support a temporary waiver certification as permitted by § 109(h)(4). The debtor was not present at the hearing for her motion and as a result, the Court struck the motion to reconsider pursuant to Local Rule of Practice 9073-1. In addition to striking the motion, the Court alternatively denied it because there was no mistake by a party or the Court that would afford grounds for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and there are no “exceptional circumstances” in this case to afford the debtor relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(6).
Title: Arnold et al v. Birchell (In re Birchell) | Date: Dec-22-2024 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Peggy Hunt) | Case(s): 22-02017
Debtor was a member of Western Chemical, LLC (“Western”). Additionally, debtor was a salaried employee of Western from April 2014 to March 2016. Debtor left Western in mid-2016 and entered into other business ventures. Western brought suit against debtor for breach of the non-compete clauses signed when debtor began employment with Western and obtained a judgement against him. Debtor filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and received a discharge. Western filed an adversary proceeding seeking to have the debt from the state court judgement declared non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) which exempts from discharge debts arising from willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or that entity’s property. The question before the Court was whether debtor had (1) willfully and (2) maliciously injured Western by breaching the non-compete clauses. To show “willful” injury, the creditor must present direct evidence that the debtor acted with the specific intent to harm a creditor or the creditor’s property, or indirect evidence that the debtor desired to cause the injury or believed the injury was substantially certain to occur. To be a “malicious” injury, the act must be one that is performed without justification or excuse. The Court ultimately determined that Western was unable to satisfy their burden by a preponderance of the evidence that debtor’s breach of the non-compete clauses was either willful or malicious. As such, the debt was not exempted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).
Title: In re Bohman | Date: Oct-23-2024 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Peggy Hunt) | Case(s): 24-22385
Debtor filed a Petition seeking relief under Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, to which a creditor objected, arguing debtor did not qualify for Subchapter V relief. To qualify for relief under Subchapter V, a debtor must be “a person engaged in commercial or business activities” with debts “not less than 50 percent of which arose from the commercial or business activities of the debtor....” 11 U.S.C. § 1182(1). The Court found that more than 50 percent of the debts scheduled by the debtor “arose from” commercial or business activities, and focused its analysis on whether the debtor was “engaged in commercial or business activities.” Applying the plain meaning of the phrase “engaged in commercial or business activities” against the “totality of the circumstances” of the case, the Court determined the debtor had not met his burden of establishing that he was “engaged in commercial or business activities” on the Petition Date, either personally or through related entities.
Title: In re Aerospace Engineering Support, Inc. | Date: May-8-2024 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Peggy Hunt) | Case(s): 23-22868
Creditor of Subchapter V debtor filed a proof of claim and a motion for relief from stay in order to seek funds associated with the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA) from non-debtor entities. The Court determined that creditor’s proof of claim was not entitled to prima facie effect under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(f), but that the creditor had still met its initial burden of proving the existence and amount of its claim. Debtor's claim objection was overruled for failure to meet its burden in attacking the validity of creditor’s claim and creditor's unsecured claim was allowed.
Next, the Court, applying the non-exclusive list of factors outlined in In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795, 799–800 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) concluded that cause existed to lift the automatic stay and allow creditor to seek funds from the non-debtor defendants. Allowing creditor to litigate the UVTA claims against the non-debtor defendants would have minimal impact on the bankruptcy estate and creditor would be unduly prejudiced if its collection action against the non-debtor defendants continued to be stayed. In conjunction with lifting the stay, the Court imposed two conditions: (1) creditor could only pursue claims that occurred before the four-year lookback period under UVTA; and (2) creditor could not take actions to collect on any agreement or judgment involving the UVTA claims.
Title: In re Inland Boat Club, LLC | Date: Mar-27-2024 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Peggy Hunt) | Case(s): 22-02071
Creditors of Subchapter V debtor filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss related to third-party claims, including an avoidance action, a declaratory judgment action, and a negligence action. Based on its review of 28 U.S.C. § 1334, the Court concluded that it did have subject matter jurisdiction over the avoidance and declaratory judgment actions because they both “arise under” the Bankruptcy Code or “arise in” the debtor's case, but the Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the negligence action as it was not a proceeding “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code, or “arising in” or “related to” the debtor’s case. The Court dismissed the avoidance action with prejudice because the debtor had released the related claims with full authority to do so in its bankruptcy case. The Court also dismissed the declaratory judgment action with prejudice because, first, it was moot, and second, even if not moot, the action was barred as an impermissible collateral attack of the debtor's confirmed plan and related orders. Finally, the Court dismissed the negligence action without prejudice because the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.