Debtor pledged stock in one of its companies to secure its guaranty of obligations owing to credit union. The pledge agreement provided that, in the event of debtor's default, credit union would have all rights with respect to the shares "as if it were the absolute owner" of them. Debtor defaulted on a payment, and credit union demanded immediate payment of all principal and interest. As payment was not made, credit union notified debtor that it would begin efforts to sell the pledged stocks. Credit Union, representing itself to be the lawful owner of the stock, ultimately entered into a sale agreement with a third party buyer, subject to some conditions. Debtor filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and, shortly thereafter, credit union and buyer closed the sale. Debtor filed an adversary complaint, seeking to avoid the sale of the stock under 11 U.S.C. § 549, as an unauthorized transfer of estate property in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). On competing motions for summary judgment, the court held that "title" to the stock was irrelevant under the Missouri version of the Uniform Commercial Code. Because credit union perfected its security interest in the stock by possession and gave debtor notice of its intent to sell, the court determined that debtor's only right with respect to the stock was a right of redemption under U.C.C. § 9-504, which terminated when credit union entered into the sale contract with third party. The court determined that the fact that conditions for purchaser's performance under the sale contract were only available to purchaser and, at most, gave debtor a redemption right that was contingent on purchaser's non-performance, and it would be improvident to grant debtor any relief under § 549 based on such a contingency. For similar reasons, the court ruled that closing of the sale to purchaser was not a violation of the automatic stay that would entitle debtor to relief. Debtor's motion for summary judgment was denied, and the motions by credit union and purchaser for summary judgment were granted. This decision was affirmed by the district court in 221.pdf.

In an action filed against it for shipping fees owed to debtor, the government counterclaimed to offset its claim against debtor for fees and penalties incurred due to insufficient funds tax payments. The parties stipulated to the facts and requested that the court decide the matter on summary judgment. Noting that, under certain circumstances, 11 U.S.C. § 553 allows a creditor to offset a debt owed to debtor against debtor's claim against it, the court emphasized that the availability of offset is left to the court's discretion. The court concluded that § 553 requires that the two debts be "mutual," which does not mean they must arise from the same transaction, and that both debts arise prepetition and are owed directly to each party. Under the stipulated facts, the court determined that offset should be allowed in the case before it.

Bank, chapter 11 debtors' largest secured creditor, sought confirmation of a plan it submitted to the court without having obtained approval of a disclosure statement and without soliciting votes on its plan from all parties in interest. Bank argued it could "cram down" its liquidating plan and, therefore, voting would be meaningless. The court held that submission of an approved disclosure statement and ballots with a proposed plan is a prerequisite to commencement of a confirmation hearing. Therefore, bank's failure to obtain approval of a disclosure statement and to solicit votes on its proposed plan rendered the plan not confirmable, even if creditor could cram down a liquidating plan over dissenting votes.

Debtors, all self-employed professionals, listed ERISA-qualified pension plan funds as assets in their bankruptcies, but claimed them as exempt under Utah law. Trustee objected to the exemptions. Debtors offered three rationales for either excluding or exempting the pension funds: (1) the funds are excluded from estate property under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2); (2) ERISA-qualified pension plans are exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A); and (3) the funds are exempt under Utah law. The court concluded that, since debtors' pension plans did not constitute spendthrift trusts under Utah law, they were not excluded from debtors' estates by § 541(c)(2). The court also concluded that the funds were not exempt under § 522(a)(2)(A), which allows debtors to exempt both property subject to state exemptions and property that is exempt under federal law, except under the alternative federal exemptions in § 522(d), because a majority of courts have held that ERISA plans are not so included. Finally, the court concluded that debtors' plans were exempt under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6(3), but only to the extent the funds were "reasonably necessary" for the support of debtors and their dependents.