Creditor filed an adversary complaint against debtor asserting that a loan was obtained by debtor based on written, materially false, statements regarding his financial condition, and that the debt was therefore non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B). After a trial, the court considered three issues, which were whether: (1) financing statements provided by debtor were "materially false," (2) creditor's predecessor "reasonably relied" on the statements, and (3) debtor had submitted the statements with the intent to deceive. The court found that debtor's financial statements were examples of extreme material falsity, that lender had reasonably relied on one of the financial statements in making the loan, and that debtor's uncorroborated denial of intent to deceive was insufficient to overcome the presumption of intent that arose from creditor's evidence on the first two issues. Creditor's claim against debtor was determined to be non-dischargeable.

Attorney appointed to represent debtor partnership filed an interim application for fees. There were no objections, and no complaints regarding attorney's work on behalf of debtor. Attorney also represented two general partners of debtor in connection with their personal bankruptcies, and all three cases were under joint administration. The court concluded that attorney was not a "disinterested person," as required by 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) and defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(E), based on his representation of both a partnership and its partners, even though such interests will generally be the same, due to the potential for conflicts to arise, especially as between the two partners. Attorney's application was denied.

Debtors filed an adversary proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment that any claims asserted by defendant in debtors' bankruptcy had been settled by contract, in addition to other relief. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the adversary complaint, asserting the court lacked jurisdiction under N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The court held that the district court's interim rule after Marathon, which had been validated by the Tenth Circuit, gave the court jurisdiction over "bankruptcy proceedings," and that debtors' adversary, which dealt with their eligibility to be chapter 13 debtors, was just such a matter. Additionally, the court noted that it continued to have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157, as the adversary was a "core matter."

Bank, the first lienholder on property subject to chapter 11 debtor's second lien, began postpetition non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. Bank then filed a motion in the bankruptcy case seeking a determination of the automatic stay's applicability, stay relief, and other alternative relief. The court held that debtor's second trust deed on the property, which was its only asset, was property of the estate and subject to the automatic stay. The court found that debtor had a three-month right to cure under state law, which had been tolled by the stay, and that foreclosure would be injurious to that right. As bank's lien was oversecured by the property, the court denied stay relief, as well as bank's requests for conversion, dismissal, and the shortening of the chapter 11 time periods pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d).