Trustee sought to set aside credit union's execution and subsequent sale of debtor's vehicle as a preference under 11 U.S.C. § 96b. The court held that delivery of the vehicle to credit union pursuant to the execution, at a time when credit union was not aware of debtor's insolvency, created a lien, or "transfer," under 11 U.S.C. § 96a(2), which precluded superior liens. Trustee's complaint was dismissed.
You are here
Opinions
The District of Utah offers a database of opinions for the years 1979 to Current, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
Opinion Archive
Click here to view the Court's Opinions in reverse Chronological order.
Title: Harris v. Fed. Emps. Credit Union (In re Moore) | Date: Nov-6-1979 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Mabey) | Case(s): 79-0020
Title: Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Green (In re Humphries), 1 B.R. 82 (Bankr.D.Utah) | Date: Oct-1-1979 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Mabey) | Case(s): 78-0342
Recognizing that the exclusive way to perfect a lien on a motor vehicle in Utah is to obtain a notation of the lien on the certificate of title, the court nonetheless found that an equitable exception to such a rule, set forth in Commerce Bank v. Chambers, 519 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1975), applied to the facts presented. In Commerce Bank, the Circuit concluded that, if creditor has done all that was required of it to perfect a lien, it should not be penalized by the debtor's failure to obtain a notation on the title, under a statute similar to Utah's that made it the buyer's responsibility to obtain a new title. In the case before it, the court held that creditor had expended significant effort in its attempt to get debtor to register its lien, including providing all necessary information needed to do so. Therefore, creditor's lien was perfected, and its complaint for reclamation of the vehicle was granted.
Title: Styler v. Scharf (In re Metal Tech Mfg., Inc.) | Date: Sep-17-1979 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Mabey) | Case(s): 78-0655
The court considered the merits of creditor's statutory right to reclaim property sold to debtor, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-702(2), in light of § 67c(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act. Since creditor's lien was not perfected, her claim was dependent upon the Utah statute, which the court held violated § 67c(1)(A), and trustee's lien was therefore superior.
Title: Rental Elecs., Inc. v. SSC Corp. (In re SSC Corp.) | Date: May-31-1979 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Mabey) | Case(s): 78-0516
Creditor's security interest in leased collateral delivered to debtor in Utah was held to be unperfected under Utah law because (1) when the collateral entered Utah, it was not yet subject to a perfected lien in California, so the 4-month grace period under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-103(1)(d) did not apply, and (2) creditor's subsequent perfection in California was ineffective in Utah, under § 70A-9-103(1)(c), as creditor was always aware that the collateral would be located in Utah.
Title: Twelves v. Prod. Credit Assoc. (In re Indian Springs Farm & Ranch, Inc.) Mason v. Prod. Credit Assoc. (In re River Bottom Equip. Leasing Co.) | Date: May-31-1979 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Mabey) | Case(s): 77-0062 and -0063
Creditor sold collateral to debtor and properly filed a financing statement under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-402. Debtor later filed a bankruptcy petition, and trustee filed a complaint seeking determination of all parties' interests in the collateral. Creditor asserted that its financing statement made its lien superior to that of the trustee, and the court considered whether creditor's description of the property in its financing statement was sufficient, under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-110, to "reasonably identify" what was covered. The court determined that a description of collateral that makes identification possible, upon reasonable inquiry, would be sufficient under the statute, and that a description of the collateral in the security agreement would be highly relevant to that issue. After the court determined which items of property held in storage were subject to creditor's lien, it determined that Utah law was unclear as to whether creditor could first foreclose on personal property and then on real property in a separate action, concluding that nothing in the statutes precluded separate actions.