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Opinions
| Case Title | Date & Status | Case Number(s) | Judge & PDF | Summary | |
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In re Plaza 106, LLC (Internal Ref: Opinion 636) |
Jun-3-2026 UNPUBLISHED |
25-25459 |
Judge Peggy Hunt |
Untimely filed proof of claim was disallowed. Creditor was required to file a proof of claim by the claims bar date under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c). Motion for relief from stay was not a proof of claim or an informal proof of claim to which the untimely-filed proof of claim could relate back. Such motions rarely serve as an informal proof of claim under the factors in Clark v. Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. (In re Reliance Equities, Inc.), 966 F.2d 1338, 1345 (10th Cir. 1992). Additionally, the claims bar date could not be extended for “excusable neglect” under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1)(A) as interpreted in Pioneer Invest. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993). Court notes that excusable neglect standard may no longer apply because of amendments made to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c)(7) and 3003(c)(3) after Pioneer was decided. | |
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In re Michel (Internal Ref: Opinion 635) |
Apr-1-2026 PUBLISHED |
25-22542 |
Judge Peggy Hunt |
Chapter 13 Trustee’s objection to confirmation of proposed plan was sustained. The plan did not comply with the best interests of creditors test under 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(4) because it provided no distribution to general unsecured creditors whereas a distribution would be made in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case based on equity in the debtor’s homestead. Only the debtor, who held title to the property, could claim a homestead exemption under Utah Code § 78B-5-503(2). His non-debtor spouse, who was not on title, could not claim an exemption because she was not an “owner” as required under § 78B-5-503(2)(b). Equitable interests in property may establish ownership, but only if a cognizable legal interest exists. Possession of property, without more, is not sufficient to establish ownership under Utah law. | |
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In re Carter (Internal Ref: Opinion 637) |
Oct-26-2025 PUBLISHED |
24-22514 |
Judge Peggy Hunt |
Debtors sought to modify their confirmed Chapter 13 plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1329 of the Bankruptcy Code to surrender a vehicle for the secured creditor to sell, with liquidation proceeds applied to the creditor’s claim and the deficiency claim treated as a general unsecured claim. Under the confirmed plan, the debtors had planned to retain and pay for the vehicle pursuant to the parties’ prepetition contracts. The Trustee objected to the modification motion, arguing that modification of the debtors’ confirmed Plan was not fair to the creditor because the creditor’s unpaid unsecured claim that was to have been paid in full would now be crammed down and discharged. The Court concluded that the post-confirmation modification was permissible because it was within the express terms of § 1329(a)(3) and, alternatively, was permitted under the plain language of § 1329(a)(1) and (a)(2). | |
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In re Correa (Internal Ref: Opinion 638) |
Jun-10-2025 PUBLISHED |
24-25099 |
Judge Peggy Hunt |
Debtors claimed a homestead exemption in their towable travel trailer, asserting it was a “mobile home” under the Utah Exemptions Act, Utah Code § 78B-5-503. The Trustee objected, contending that the towable travel trailer was not a “mobile home” as defined in Utah’s Motor Vehicle Act and various municipal ordinances. Relying on the statutory definition of a “mobile home” under the Utah Exemptions Act, which the Utah Legislature tethered to the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act, Utah Code § 57-16-3(4), the Court determined that the debtors’ towable travel trailer did constitute a “mobile home” and was therefore entitled to an exemption under the Utah Exemptions Act. | |
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In re Gasperini (Internal Ref: Opinion 639) |
May-28-2025 PUBLISHED |
25-21528 |
Judge Peggy Hunt |
The Chapter 13 debtors filed a motion to impose the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 362(c)(4)(A)(i). The debtors had two Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases dismissed in the previous year and were not entitled to the protection of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 362(c)(4)(A). The Credit Union objected, claiming that the debtors failed to demonstrate good faith under 11 U.S.C § 362(c)(4)(B) and could not propose a feasible plan. Thereafter, the Credit Union’s Objection was resolved through a settlement agreement reached with the debtor. In determining whether the case was filed in good faith and whether the automatic stay should apply to all creditors, the Court relied on (1) the Galanis factors, extending the application of the factors to 11 U.S.C § 362(c)(4)(B) rather than just to 11 U.S.C § 362(c)(3)(B) as the factors have previously been applied, and (2) subsections (II) and (III) of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i). Using these factors to evaluate the totality of the circumstances test, including consideration of the debtors’ increased income, the Court imposed the automatic stay on all creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 362(c)(3)(B) and determined that the case was not filed in bad faith. | |
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In re Mohammed (Internal Ref: Opinion 640) |
May-15-2025 PUBLISHED |
25-21265 |
Judge Peggy Hunt |
Pro Se Chapter 13 debtor filed a motion for relief and reconsideration from an order denying motion to vacate dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. Debtor’s voluntary Chapter 13 petition had been dismissed for failure to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 109(h). Under § 109(h), debtor was not eligible to be a debtor because she had not obtained prepetition credit-counseling as required under § 109(h)(1), made a counseling extension request as allowed by § 109(h)(3), or shown any basis to support a temporary waiver certification as permitted by § 109(h)(4). The debtor was not present at the hearing for her motion and as a result, the Court struck the motion to reconsider pursuant to Local Rule of Practice 9073-1. In addition to striking the motion, the Court alternatively denied it because there was no mistake by a party or the Court that would afford grounds for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and there are no “exceptional circumstances” in this case to afford the debtor relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(6). | |
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Arnold et al v. Birchell (In re Birchell) (Internal Ref: Opinion 641) |
Dec-22-2024 PUBLISHED |
22-02017 |
Judge Peggy Hunt |
Debtor was a member of Western Chemical, LLC (“Western”). Additionally, debtor was a salaried employee of Western from April 2014 to March 2016. Debtor left Western in mid-2016 and entered into other business ventures. Western brought suit against debtor for breach of the non-compete clauses signed when debtor began employment with Western and obtained a judgement against him. Debtor filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and received a discharge. Western filed an adversary proceeding seeking to have the debt from the state court judgement declared non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) which exempts from discharge debts arising from willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or that entity’s property. The question before the Court was whether debtor had (1) willfully and (2) maliciously injured Western by breaching the non-compete clauses. To show “willful” injury, the creditor must present direct evidence that the debtor acted with the specific intent to harm a creditor or the creditor’s property, or indirect evidence that the debtor desired to cause the injury or believed the injury was substantially certain to occur. To be a “malicious” injury, the act must be one that is performed without justification or excuse. The Court ultimately determined that Western was unable to satisfy their burden by a preponderance of the evidence that debtor’s breach of the non-compete clauses was either willful or malicious. As such, the debt was not exempted from discharge under § 523(a)(6). | |
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In re Bohman (Internal Ref: Opinion 642) |
Oct-23-2024 PUBLISHED |
24-22385 |
Judge Peggy Hunt |
Debtor filed a Petition seeking relief under Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, to which a creditor objected, arguing debtor did not qualify for Subchapter V relief. To qualify for relief under Subchapter V, a debtor must be “a person engaged in commercial or business activities” with debts “not less than 50 percent of which arose from the commercial or business activities of the debtor....” 11 U.S.C. § 1182(1). The Court found that more than 50 percent of the debts scheduled by the debtor “arose from” commercial or business activities, and focused its analysis on whether the debtor was “engaged in commercial or business activities.” Applying the plain meaning of the phrase “engaged in commercial or business activities” against the “totality of the circumstances” of the case, the Court determined the debtor had not met his burden of establishing that he was “engaged in commercial or business activities” on the Petition Date, either personally or through related entities. | |
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In re Aerospace Engineering Support, Inc. (Internal Ref: Opinion 643) |
May-8-2024 PUBLISHED |
23-22868 |
Judge Peggy Hunt |
Creditor of Subchapter V debtor filed a proof of claim and a motion for relief from stay in order to seek funds associated with the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA) from non-debtor entities. The Court determined that creditor’s proof of claim was not entitled to prima facie effect under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(f), but that the creditor had still met its initial burden of proving the existence and amount of its claim. Debtor's claim objection was overruled for failure to meet its burden in attacking the validity of creditor’s claim and creditor's unsecured claim was allowed. Next, the Court, applying the non-exclusive list of factors outlined in In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795, 799–800 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) concluded that cause existed to lift the automatic stay and allow creditor to seek funds from the non-debtor defendants. Allowing creditor to litigate the UVTA claims against the non-debtor defendants would have minimal impact on the bankruptcy estate and creditor would be unduly prejudiced if its collection action against the non-debtor defendants continued to be stayed. In conjunction with lifting the stay, the Court imposed two conditions: (1) creditor could only pursue claims that occurred before the four-year lookback period under UVTA; and (2) creditor could not take actions to collect on any agreement or judgment involving the UVTA claims. | |
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In re Inland Boat Club, LLC (Internal Ref: Opinion 644) |
Mar-27-2024 PUBLISHED |
22-02071 |
Judge Peggy Hunt |
Creditors of Subchapter V debtor filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss related to third-party claims, including an avoidance action, a declaratory judgment action, and a negligence action. Based on its review of 28 U.S.C. § 1334, the Court concluded that it did have subject matter jurisdiction over the avoidance and declaratory judgment actions because they both “arise under” the Bankruptcy Code or “arise in” the debtor's case, but the Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the negligence action as it was not a proceeding “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code, or “arising in” or “related to” the debtor’s case. The Court dismissed the avoidance action with prejudice because the debtor had released the related claims with full authority to do so in its bankruptcy case. The Court also dismissed the declaratory judgment action with prejudice because, first, it was moot, and second, even if not moot, the action was barred as an impermissible collateral attack of the debtor's confirmed plan and related orders. Finally, the Court dismissed the negligence action without prejudice because the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. | |
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In re Hafen (Internal Ref: Opinion 631) |
Jun-3-2022 PUBLISHED |
04-25018 |
Judge Thurman |
On remand from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit, the Court was tasked with determining the standing of a group of creditors to bring state law claims against affiliates of the Debtor, and the Debtor himself by name only, taking place many years after the Debtor received his discharge. After determining that the group of creditors did own the claims at issue concurrently with the Trustee, and with the closure of the bankruptcy case, the creditors now had standing again to bring the claims in state court; then, the Court was tasked with determining whether the group of creditors violated the Debtor’s discharge injunction by bringing the claims, despite not seeking to recovery from the Debtor. Applying the tests of In re Robben, 562 B.R. 469 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2017) and In re Walker, 927 F.2d 1142 (10th Cir. 1991), the Court determined the group of creditors did violate the discharge injunction because the Debtor’s inclusion was not a prerequisite for recovery from the third party defendants. | |
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In re SoNev Construction, LLC (Internal Ref: Opinion 630) |
Jun-2-2022 PUBLISHED |
22-21037 |
Judge Thurman |
The Court was required to determine the proper location to file a UCC Financing Statement in order to be properly perfected as a secured creditor. The Debtor at issue is a registered organization of Nevada, but has a principal place of business in Utah. The Creditor at issue filed a financing statement solely in the state of Utah. Based on the identical provisions of the UCC adopted by UT and NV, the Court determined that Nevada is the sole location to file a financing statement to perfect an interest in property, because the Debtor is a “registered organization” of Nevada and the UCC limited the location for perfecting an interest to solely the state of registration. Accordingly, the particular creditor was determined to not have a perfected security interest in the property. | |
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In re Offer Space (Internal Ref: Opinion 629) |
Apr-22-2021 PUBLISHED |
20-27480 |
The Court was tasked with analyzing what "engaged in commercial or business activities" means under sub V. The Court determined that (1) debtor must be currently engaged in business activity, and (2) deciding if debtor was currently engaged required a totality of the circumstances analysis. The issue being argued was that the business was shuddered, and therefore the Debtor was not engaged in business activities. The Court determined the Debtor was actively engaged in business activities as of the Petition Date due to having bank accounts, accounts receivable, analyzing counterclaims, managing its stock, and winding down its business to realize value for creditors, and therefore was eligible to proceed in Subchapter 5 of Chapter 11. | ||
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In re Abel (Internal Ref: Opinion 628) |
Aug-14-2020 UNPUBLISHED |
20-21042 |
Judge Anderson |
The Debtor moved from Montana to Utah prior to filing her bankruptcy petition and the Bankruptcy Code's domiciliary provision required her to claim Montana exemptions. The issue was whether the Montana residency limitation on exemptions applied to debtors in bankruptcy, or in the alternative, whether 11 U.S.C. Section 522(b)(3) permitted the Debtor to claim federal or Montana exemptions against some, none, or all of her assets. Based on precedent from the Montana Supreme Court and applying the plain meaning of each word while observing the distinction between an individual and a resident, the Court found that the specifics of Mont. Code Ann. Section 31-2-106 controlled over the general of Mont. Code Ann. Section 25-13-6. In the alternative the Court held that if Montana limits its exemptions to residents, then the Debtor was rendered ineligible for any exemption and the safety net in 11 U.S.C. Section 522 applied. The Court would apply the State specific interpretation to apply the state law to the fullest extent possible, including any limitations imposed by the Montana exemption statute on the category or amount of a Montana exemption. | |
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In re Ulloa (Internal Ref: Opinion 627) |
Jun-18-2020 PUBLISHED |
18-20366 |
Judge Anderson |
The Debtors sought to retain $16,813.44 issued by Wells Fargo as a refund for an unecessary, forced placement of collateral protection insurance in 2008 in connection with the Debtors' vehicle loan. The Court found that the refund was property fo the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. Section 541 to which the trustee was entitled to administer for the benefit of the estate. | |
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In re Hazlett (Internal Ref: Opinion 626) |
Feb-13-2020 PUBLISHED |
16-30360 |
Judge Anderson |
The Court denied the Debtor's motion to reconsider seeking relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b), 59(e), and 60(b) made applicable to bankruptcy cases by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052, 9023, and 9024. The Debtor did not persuade the Court than an error, manifest or otherwise, was committed in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter. | |
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Arma Yates, LLC v. Robertson (In re Robertson) (Internal Ref: Opinion 625) |
Jan-9-2020 PUBLISHED |
18-02059 |
Judge Anderson |
In an action objecting to the Debtors' discharge under 11 U.S.C. Section 727(a)(2)(A), 727(a)(2)(B), 727(a)(3), 727(a)(4), and 727(a)(5), the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. | |
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Densley v. Dyches (In re Dyches) (Internal Ref: Opinion 600) |
Dec-13-2019 UNPUBLISHED |
10-2653 |
Judge Mosier |
Plaintiff obtained a money judgment in Utah state court against Defendant. When the Defendant filed bankruptcy, Plaintiff commenced a § 523 proceeding to except the judgment from discharge. Defendant failed to answer, and a default judgment was entered. Shortly less than eight years after entry of the bankruptcy default, Plaintiff filed a motion in the adversary proceeding to renew the default judgment in accordance with Utah law. The Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion, concluding that the Plaintiff had not filed it within the "original action", as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1802. The Court noted that a nondischargeability judgment is composed of two parts: the judgment on the underlying debt and the judgment of nondischargeability. The Court then held that the "original action," within the context of a nondischargeability judgment, is the judicial proceeding in which the judgment liquidating the underlying debt is first obtained. Because the debt between the Plaintiff and Defendant had been liquidated in state court, that proceeding was the "original action" under Utah law. | |
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In re Cloward (Internal Ref: Opinion 624) |
Nov-19-2019 PUBLISHED |
18-24837 |
Judge Anderson |
Under Utah Hospital Lien Statute, lien arises and attaches when hospital provides emergency medical services to patient injured in an accident. | |
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In re Hazlett (Internal Ref: Opinion 623) |
Oct-17-2019 PUBLISHED |
16-30360 |
Judge Anderson |
Debtors attorney did not violate the automatic stay under SS 362 because the attorneys post-petition services arose under a post-petition agreement. | |
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First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Smith (In re Smith) (Internal Ref: Opinion 622) |
Sep-5-2019 PUBLISHED |
17-02076 |
Judge Anderson |
Following entry of a judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs on the Plaintiffs' SS 523(a)(6) claim, the parties disputed the amount of attorney fees and costs and post-judgment interest that should be included in the non-dischargeable debt amount. The Court held that the attorney fees and costs awarded to the Plaintiffs previously by the District Court were non-dischargeable. As to Plaintiffs' attorney fees and costs incurred in prosecuting its nondischargeability action, the Court found no statutory basis to award fees and costs and found that the American Rule precluded such an award because the action arose in tort rather than contract. The Court found that the interest rate set forth in the District Court's previous judgment remained the rate of interest on the non-dischargeable District Court judgment. | |
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J. Hoyt Stephenson et al v. Thrive National Corp et al (In re Thrive National Corp. and Thrive Systems, Inc.) (Internal Ref: Opinion 621) |
Aug-12-2019 PUBLISHED |
18-02076 |
Judge Anderson |
After evaluating the factors of permissive abstention set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 1334(c)(1) and In re Commercial Fiv. Servs., Inc., 251 B.R. 414 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2009), the Court in its discretion opted to exercise permissive abstention. | |
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Bird v. Wardley (In re White) (Internal Ref: Opinion 620) |
Jul-11-2019 PUBLISHED |
16-02089 |
Judge Anderson |
Trustee could not use statute of frauds and SS 544 to avoid a personal guaranty because it was an affirmative defense unique to the debtor. Further, the trustee could not step into the shoes of the debtor under SS 541 to assert the statute of frauds because the debtor previously waived the defense to the guaranty when he paid it. The case also discusses the Main Purpose and Partial Performance exceptions to the statute of frauds. Finally, the effective date stated in the guaranty controlled even though it was signed some months later. The Court thus rejected the trustee's theories to avoid the guaranty obligation. | |
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First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Smith (In re Smith) (Internal Ref: Opinion 619) |
Jul-10-2019 PUBLISHED |
17-02076 |
Judge Anderson |
Debtor started company and took key employees that directly competed with his employer, resulting in damages to former employer. Court held debt was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. SS 523(a)(6), finding that debtor willfully and maliciously injured creditor. | |
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In re Hazlett (Internal Ref: Opinion 618) |
Apr-10-2019 PUBLISHED |
16-30360 |
Judge Anderson |
Sanctions were not warranted against debtor's attorney for use of bifurcated fee agreement in Chapter 7 case because there were adequate disclosures, fees were reasonable, and process did not harm debtor, but instead facilitated debtor's ability to afford legal counsel to receive a discharge. | |
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In re Sugarloaf Holdings, LLC (Internal Ref: Opinion 617) |
Apr-2-2019 PUBLISHED |
18-27705 |
Judge Anderson |
Debtor's appraiser did not file an application to be employed before performing services; thus, Court disallowed fees incurred before filing of application. In addition, appraiser did not establish extraodinary or exceptional circumstances to support a grant of nunc pro tunc relief. | |
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Valadez v. Salazar (In re Salazar) (Internal Ref: Opinion 616) |
Jan-18-2019 PUBLISHED |
17-02005 |
Judge Anderson |
Debtor borrowed money from plaintiff and gave him the certificate of title to her car as collateral. Debtor then fraudulently obtained duplicate title and used it to secure other loans. Based on this and other misconduct, the Court found debt to be nondischargeable under SS 523(a)(2)(A) for actual fraud. | |
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In re Traylor (Internal Ref: Opinion 615) |
Jan-10-2019 PUBLISHED |
18-23314 |
Judge Anderson |
The Court sustained trustee's objection to confirmation of chapter 13 plan, holding that the debtors may not take the vehicle ownership deduction on the Mean Test for a title loan on their vehicle. | |
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In re Kelley (Internal Ref: Opinion 614) |
Jan-4-2019 PUBLISHED |
17-29915 |
Judge Anderson |
The Court granted debtors' motion for sanctions, holding that creditor (Vivint) had actual notice of the bankruptcy and was willfully violating the automatic stay under SS 362(k) when it continued to contact the debtors for collection and ultimately assigned the debt to a collection agency for legal action. Vivint received five notices from the Bankruptcy Noticing Center but claimed it had no notice of the debtor's filing. The Court awarded compensatory and punitive damages, along with attorney's fees and costs. | |
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In re Kiley (Internal Ref: Opinion 613) |
Dec-4-2018 PUBLISHED |
15-27838 |
Judge Anderson |
One day before bankruptcy filing, a divorce mediation awarded debtor one-half of value of ex-spouse's retirement account (essentially a lump sum, cash award). A few weeks later, the divorce court entered its order dividing the couple's marital property. The bankruptcy court held that an interest in marital property remains inchoate until the divorce court makes a formal division of the marital property. Because the debtor's interest in the value of the retirement account became choate within 180 days of the bankruptcy filing, it was property of bankruptcy estate subject to administration by the trustee. The decision also discusses the Utah exemption of interest in a retirement plan and a qualified domestic support obligation. |
