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Opinions

The District of Utah offers a database of opinions for the years 1979 to Current, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.

Opinion Archive

Click here to view the Court's Opinions in reverse Chronological order.


Title: Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 87 B.R. 676 (Bankr.D.Utah) | Date: Jun-15-1988 | Status: PUBLISHED See 908 F.2d 588 (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 87PC-0116

Debtors filed an adversary action against a secured creditor, asserting that they could redeem abandoned secured property, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(d), by paying creditor the property's fair market value. Debtors argued that, since an allowed secured claim is limited to the value of the collateral by § 506(a), they should be able to pay creditor that value and take the property free and clear of creditor's security interest. The court extensively discussed the role of § 506 in bankruptcy, concluding that it only applies to property in which the estate has an interest. Since the estate has no interest in property that has been abandoned, that provision is not applicable to abandoned property. In addition, rights in abandoned property are considered the same as if no bankruptcy had been filed. Therefore, § 506(d) does not grant debtors any greater rights in abandoned property than they had under prepetition non-bankruptcy law. This decision was affirmed by the district court, and later by the Tenth Circuit.


Title: In re Dunyon | Date: May-27-1988 | Status: UNPUBLISHED See 274.pdf (Judge Boulden) | Case(s): 87B-4887

Creditor obtained a prepetition judgment against debtor, and continued its efforts to collect that judgment after debtor filed a chapter 7 petition. The court found that creditor's conduct constituted a willful violation of the automatic stay, without justification, and awarded sanctions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(h). This decision was upheld, but remanded for recalculation of the amount of fees that were a direct, foreseeable consequence of creditor's conduct in 274.pdf.


Title: Cmty. First Bank v. Quinlan (In re Quinlan) | Date: May-26-1988 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Boulden) | Case(s): 87PB-0893

Plaintiff's non-dischargeability action was dismissed for failure to file the pretrial order, and plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, arguing excusable neglect under Bankruptcy Rule 9024. In finding no excusable neglect, the court noted that cumulative procedural and substantive deficiencies in the case were evidence of, at best, failure to attend to detail and, at worst, a cavalier attitude toward the court. Therefore, plaintiff's motion was denied with respect to its 11 U.S.C. § 523 cause of action. The court considered the problems with plaintiff's 11 U.S.C. § 727 action to be much more serious, noting that plaintiff's counsel had obtained the information in support of the claims against debtor by virtue of his previous role as trustee of debtor's estate. Counsel resigned as the trustee and filed plaintiff's complaint against debtor on the same day, which was also the last day for filing objections to discharge. The court found that acting as the trustee and representing a creditor of the estate was clearly a conflict of interest, and that the conflict was not cured by counsel's withdrawal as trustee. The court granted the motion to reinstate the § 727 cause of action, directed the US Trustee to take steps to ensure proper administration of the estate, and directed the chapter 7 trustee that had been appointed after plaintiff's counsel resigned to either schedule a pre-trial conference on the § 727 claim, or move to dismiss the adversary proceeding, within twenty days.


Title: In re The Weber Clinic | Date: May-12-1988 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Allen) | Case(s): 86A-0633

A lender to non-debtors filed a claim in debtor's bankruptcy based on a trust deed to debtor's property that was executed by debtor's president as security for the loan. The court chose not to determine whether the trust deed was enforceable and, instead, considered whether it had been released by lender's settlement with, and release of, one of the loan obligors. The court held that, under Utah law, a lender's release of one of several obligors, made without express written reservation of lender's rights against the other obligors, acts as a release of all obligors from the agreement. Therefore, lender's claim against debtor's estate was denied.


Title: Am. Cmty. Serv., Inc. v. Wright Mktg., Inc. (In re Am. Cmty. Serv., Inc.) | Date: Apr-29-1988 | Status: WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE Unpublished (U.S. District Court, Utah) | Case(s): 86PC-0996

The district court found "cause" under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) to permissively withdraw the reference of a non-core adversary proceeding from the bankruptcy court. In so doing, the district court held that cause for permissive withdrawal of the reference is limited to a narrow set of circumstances, the existence of which is determined on the facts presented by each particular case, and withdrawal is generally appropriate when either judicial economy would be served or a party has a right to a jury trial. In the case before it, the non-debtor defendant had a seventh amendment right to a jury trial, which it had timely demanded, and it had not consented to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Reference was therefore withdrawn.


Title: Bowen v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Bowen), 84 B.R. 214 (Bankr.D.Utah) | Date: Mar-28-1988 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Boulden) | Case(s): 87PB-0236

The court considered the proper method of calculating penalties under Internal Revenue Code § 6700, which was enacted as part of an effort to eliminate abusive tax shelters. Having considered the arguments of both the IRS and the chapter 11 debtor subject to such penalties, the court determined that a transactional assessment of the penalty was not supportable, and that the penalty should be assessed on a one-time basis, rather than annually.


Title: In re Terracor, 86 B.R. 671 (Bankr.D.Utah) | Date: Mar-10-1988 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Boulden) | Case(s): 81B-0599 through -0602, and 81B-0689 through -0696

The court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction to consider a dispute between non-debtors that related to a chapter 11 plan confirmed more than five years prior to the dispute. However, the court concluded, based on the facts before it, that permissive abstention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) was appropriate. The court recommended to the district court that, in cases involving confirmed chapter 11 plans that are largely completed and resolution of the dispute will have little or no effect on the bankruptcy case, disputes between third parties should not be determined in the bankruptcy court and permissive abstention should be used to transfer such cases back to jurisdictions statutorily designated to handle them.


Title: Orem Postal Credit Union v. Twitchell (In re Twitchell) | Date: Feb-22-1988 | Status: APPEAL 91 B.R. 961 (D.Utah) See 224.pdf (U.S. District Court, Utah) | Case(s): 85PA-0922

Chapter 7 debtor, the president and treasurer of plaintiff credit union, appealed a bankruptcy court decision that concluded plaintiff's claim against him was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). The sole issue on appeal was whether debtor was acting in a fiduciary capacity when the proven defalcations took place. The district court noted that the general meaning of "fiduciary" is far too broad for the purposes of § 523(a)(4), which is narrowly construed, and that fiduciary capacity under the statute has been defined as arising only from an express or technical trust. The court rejected the position taken by some courts that debts due to breach of fiduciary duties by corporate or bank officers is sufficient to satisfy § 523(a)(4), finding that interpretation to be overly broad. The court concluded that plaintiff was required to show that all of debtor's defalcations occurred while he was acting as a trustee under a pre-existing express agreement or statute. Finding that no express agreement or statute made debtor a trustee over plaintiff's funds, the court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision.


Title: In re Ret. Inn at Forest Lane, Ltd. | Date: Feb-16-1988 | Status: APPEAL 83 B.R. 795 (D.Utah) (U.S. District Court, Utah (en banc)) | Case(s): 84A-4462

The district court considered a creditor's motion for change of venue of a bankruptcy case, en banc. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court's practice of automatically transmitting change of venue cases to the district court for disposition was not in keeping with the spirit and interpretation of various statutes, bankruptcy rules, and Local Rule B-106. The court resolved to amend Rule B-106 to provide that motions for change of venue in bankruptcy cases would thereafter be heard initially by the bankruptcy court, which would then provide a report and recommendation on the motion to the district court. In the case before it, the district court granted the motion to change venue in order to avoid further delay.


Title: The Lockhart Co. v. Multi-Resort Ownership P'ship (In re Sweetwater) | Date: Jan-11-1988 | Status: APPEAL Unpublished (U.S. District Court, Utah) | Case(s): 86PA-0766

Prior to debtor's bankruptcy filing, plaintiff perfected a security interest in several contracts whereby debtor sold interests in recreational property. Under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-403(2), a filed financing statement is effective perfection for a period of five years from its filing, but must be re-perfected by filing a continuation statement prior to the end of the perfection period. However, if a security interest is perfected when insolvency proceedings are initiated, the perfection continues until either the perfection period runs, or sixty days after the insolvency proceedings terminate. Debtor's chapter 11 plan was confirmed in June 1984. Approximately five months later, debtor contested plaintiff's secured claim on the ground that plaintiff had not filed a continuation statement in accordance with § 70A-9-403(2). The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of debtor, determining that plaintiff's perfected security interest lapsed sixty days after the effective date of debtor's plan, and plaintiff appealed. The district court affirmed, ruling that a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding terminates on the effective date of the confirmed plan, and neither the bankruptcy court's retention of jurisdiction to further litigate the validity or extent of claims, nor a pending objection to the claim in the bankruptcy case, relieved plaintiff of its obligation to file a continuation statement.

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