The district court considered, on interlocutory appeal, whether the bankruptcy court erred in deciding that creditor's cause of action to recover funds that were transferred by debtor-in-possession to its attorney, allegedly in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2), was a core bankruptcy proceeding. The district court concluded that the bankruptcy court had properly decided that creditor's cause of action was a core matter, since the claim asserted unauthorized use of cash collateral under the bankruptcy code. The district court also rejected appellant's argument that dismissal of the bankruptcy case should also have resulted in dismissal of the adversary proceeding, concluding that the underlying bankruptcy case was closed, rather than dismissed, and therefore the bankruptcy court had discretion to hear the adversary matter. Finally, the district court rejected appellant's claim that creditors cannot recover against third-parties under § 363(c)(2), concluding that a party whose rights were created by bankruptcy law may pursue violations of those rights in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court's order was affirmed.
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Title: Fed. Savings and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Smith (In re LittleTree Inns-Layton, Inc.) | Date: Apr-3-1989 | Status: APPEAL Unpublished (U.S. District Court, Utah) | Case(s): 88PC-0018
Title: Scovill v. Beauty, Inc. (In re Scovill) | Date: Mar-14-1989 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 88PC-0929
Debtor filed an adversary proceeding against defendant, and defendant filed a motion for abstention, which debtor opposed. The court described the adversary proceeding, in which the parties' claims were essentially identical to ones they had asserted in a prepetition state court action, as a "garden-variety notes receivable action" based entirely on state law, and concluded that such actions were not core bankruptcy proceedings. Finding that all of the requisites of abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) had been satisfied, the court indicated that it believed abstention to be mandatory. Alternatively, the court concluded that, even if abstention was discretionary, an analysis of the factors in § 1334(c)(1) also led it to conclude that abstention was appropriate. The court submitted its decision as a report and recommendation to the district court.
Title: R.D. Bailey Rigging, Inc. v. United States (In re R.D. Bailey Rigging, Inc.) | Date: Mar-10-1989 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Boulden) | Case(s): 87PB-0475
For many years prior to its bankruptcy, debtor provided freight-hauling services to the United States, for which it was paid in accordance with bills of lading it submitted. The court was presented with debtor's claim that the United States had been undercharged for some services, and the United States' claim that it had been overcharged for some. Based on evidence presented in the adversary proceeding, the court ruled that debtor was entitled to recover some of its claimed undercharges, the United States was entitled to include all of its overcharges in its claim in debtor's bankruptcy, and the United States could setoff receivables of the debtor against the overcharges.
Title: In re Vasilacopulos | Date: Mar-9-1989 | Status: APPEAL Unpublished (U.S. District Court, Utah) | Case(s): 82C-1031
Bankruptcy trustee, through its attorneys, filed an adversary proceeding against third party defendants, seeking to recover allegedly fraudulent transfers. The attorneys subsequently discovered that other members of their law firm had previously represented defendants. The potential conflict of interest was immediately disclosed, and both trustee and the defendants waived any conflict. Debtor later moved for removal of the law firm that represented trustee, claiming conflict of interest. Debtor also filed a motion to remove the bankruptcy trustee, claiming that inadequate notice had been given of the conversion of debtor's involuntary bankruptcy from chapter 7 to chapter 11. Both of debtor's motions were denied by the bankruptcy court, and debtor appealed. The district court held that the bankruptcy court had properly denied both of debtor's motions.
Title: Main Hurdman v. Anderson (In re Vasilacopulos) | Date: Feb-6-1989 | Status: UNPUBLISHED See 259.pdf (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 84PC-1094
The court previously ordered that bankruptcy trustee could recover amounts transferred by debtor to defendants, plus interest, as fraudulent conveyances under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2). That order was affirmed by the district court in 259.pdf. In this proceeding, the court determined the amounts trustee could recover from each defendant. The majority of defendants did not present evidence in opposition to trustee's claim against them, and the court found that trustee had sufficiently proven the amounts of each of those claims. The court then separately considered the evidence relating to trustee's claim against each defendant who disputed the claim against them. After determining the amount of each avoidable payment, the court concluded that trustee could recover interest on those amounts, at the rate applicable under Utah law as of the day trustee sent demand letters to defendants.
Title: BancBoston Fin. Co. v. Dunyon (In re Dunyon) | Date: Jan-18-1989 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Boulden) | Case(s): 87PB-0960
Bank filed a complaint against debtor seeking non-dischargeability, under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B), of a debt arising from debtor's personal guaranty of a loan that bank had made to a company controlled by debtor. The court denied bank's complaint on the ground that bank had failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the necessary elements of its claims. Although bank had established that the borrower had provided false information to bank with intent to defraud, bank had not sufficiently tied debtor to that false information to establish debtor's intent to defraud. Bank also failed to establish that it had reasonably relied on the false statements in lending money to the borrower.
Title: In re Dunyon | Date: Dec-30-1988 | Status: APPEAL Unpublished See 251.pdf (U.S. District Court, Utah) | Case(s): 87B-4887
The bankruptcy court imposed sanctions under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) against creditor and its counsel for violating the bankruptcy automatic stay. On appeal, the district court concluded that the bankruptcy court's findings, to the effect that appellants had violated the stay by re-filing state court claims against debtor and debtor's companies, were not clearly erroneous. The district court noted, however, that not all of the fees awarded as sanctions were a direct, foreseeable consequence of appellants' actions. The matter was remanded to the bankruptcy court for recalculation of the sanctions amount.
Title: Rothey v. Shah (In re Shah) | Date: Dec-13-1988 | Status: APPEAL Unpublished (U.S. District Court, Utah) | Case(s): 84PC-0059
Creditor claimed the debt owed it by chapter 7 debtor was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), but the bankruptcy court held that creditor's forbearance from calling his demand note did not constitute an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit within the meaning of § 523(a)(2). Creditor appealed, and the district court held that, if proven, a creditor's forbearance from demanding payment of a demand note, resulting from creditor's reliance on debtor's false statements, would constitute an extension of credit subject to § 523(a)(2). Since creditor had claimed that he did not demand payment because debtor provided him with false financial statements, his claim was that those statements allowed debtor to continue the parties' debtor-creditor relationship, which was an extension of credit subject to § 523(a)(2). The case was remanded to the bankruptcy court for determinations of fact with respect to whether debtor's statements were false and intended to deceive creditor and, if so, whether creditor's reliance on them was reasonable.
Title: Calder v. Segal (In re Calder), 94 B.R. 200 (Bankr.D.Utah) | Date: Dec-8-1988 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Allen) | Case(s): 88PA-0021
The Chapter 13 Trustee sent fee payments for legal services rendered by the chapter 7 debtor, an attorney, to debtor's chapter 7 trustee. Debtor filed an adversary proceeding against the chapter 7 trustee, in which he asserted that the legal fees were not property of the estate. Debtor argued that the fees were not estate property because payment of them had been contingent on confirmation of his clients' plans, and that the fees were therefore postpetition payments for services rendered, which belong to the debtor. The court considered 11 U.S.C. § 541, which defines property of the estate. Specifically, § 541(a)(6) includes "proceeds" of estate property within that definition, but excepts earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the petition was filed. The court concluded that all postpetition payments that were for services actually performed prepetition were "proceeds" of debtor's estate, and therefore property of the estate.
Title: Deseret Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. Brianhead Royale Dev. Corp. (In re Brianhead Royale Dev. Corp.) | Date: Nov-29-1988 | Status: APPEAL Unpublished (U.S. District Court, Utah) | Case(s): 87PA-0063
In connection with appellee's motion to dismiss, the district court considered whether the notice of appeal was sufficient to provide it jurisdiction over the appeal. The district court found, first, that parties not named as appellants in the notice of appeal had forfeited their right to appeal. Next, the court determined that appellant sought only to appeal that portion of the bankruptcy court's order that granted partial summary judgment. Based on that finding, the court considered whether the appeal met the 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) standards for interlocutory appeals, concluding that it did not. The motion to dismiss the appeal was granted.