Trustee objected to debtors' exemption claim under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-8(2) on the ground that debtor had admitted that other vehicles could be provided for him in his employment. The court rejected the objection as insufficient, concluding that the exemption statute applies to vehicles used in a business or profession, but does not require the vehicle to be necessary in light of available substitute vehicles.

Chapter 13 debtors filed a complaint to avoid liens pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). In defense, defendant asserted that § 522(f) is not applicable in chapter 13 cases. The court disagreed, stating several reasons why § 522(f) was applicable in chapter 13. The court also rejected defendant's assertion that § 522(f) was inconsistent with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a), which requires that creditors retain their liens in order for a chapter 13 plan to be confirmed, noting that avoided liens need not be included in the plan. The court also noted that chapter 11 contains a similar provision to § 522(f), which is 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I), and defendant's interpretation would therefore eviscerate every avoidance power under both chapters, which was a result Congress could not have intended.

Plaintiff, which held a lien on one of fourteen homes owned and rented out by chapter 11 debtors, sought relief from stay to foreclose its lien. The complaint alleged that debtors had no equity in the home, and had no prospect of rehabilitation. The court found that debtors did not have any equity in the property, and had not presented evidence concerning their rehabilitation prospects. However, the court agreed with debtors that the standard under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) was not based on rehabilitation prospects, but on the necessity of the property to an effective reorganization. In considering the statutory language, the court ruled that an "effective reorganization" could be either an effective rehabilitation or an effective liquidation, and that the standard was therefore a necessity, rather than a rehabilitation, test. As most courts analyzed § 362(d)(2)(B) as a rehabilitation test, the court adopted its own necessity criteria for situations in which debtors have no equity in the property, which was that property is necessary to an effective reorganization whenever it is necessary, either to operation of the business or in a plan, to further the interests of the estate through either rehabilitation or liquidation. Because the home at issue was producing net income, the court found that it satisfied the § 362(d)(2)(B) necessity test, and relief from stay was denied.

Chapter 7 debtor sought to avoid three prepetition garnishments by creditor as preferences under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) and 11 U.S.C. § 522(h). Creditor denied that debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfers, claiming that he had regular employment and a high income. Debtor stated that his filings established his insolvency when the transfers occurred, and relied on the § 547(f) presumption of insolvency during the 90-day period prior to filing of the petition. The court determined that creditor had failed to meet its burden to rebut the presumption and, therefore, debtor was insolvent during the 90-day period. The only remaining issues were whether the transfers occurred in the 90-day period, and whether they allowed creditor to recover more than it would have received in a distribution under the Code. The court noted that garnishment proceedings under Utah law involve several steps, at least two of which would be considered "transfers" under 11 U.S.C. § 101(40). However, § 547(e)(3) provides that a transfer does not occur until debtor has acquired rights in the transferred property. Therefore, on the day the writ of garnishment was served on debtor's employer, a transfer of all wages debtor had already earned took place on that date, and subsequent wages within the same pay period were "transferred" to creditor on each day they were earned by debtor. Any garnishments of wages earned within the 90-day period were therefore avoidable.