Secured creditor of chapter 11 debtor sought relief from stay, after which the parties agreed to the value of the collateral and the amount owed, and to other conditions that would adequately protect creditor's interest. Debtor defaulted on the payment provision it had agreed to, and the stay was lifted according to the terms of the parties' agreement. Debtor's case was converted to chapter 7, and fee applications were submitted by counsel for debtor and counsel for the creditors committee, to which creditor objected on the basis of its superpriority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(b). As of the date on which the stay was lifted, the court determined that the collateral had significantly decreased in value due to various circumstances, including debtor's use of the collateral, error in the stipulated values, and uninsured loss of one of three secured tractors, due to debtor's inadvertent failure to obtain insurance on it as required by the stipulation. The court explained that the concepts of adequate protection and superpriority are related and intertwined. Adequate protection initially shields the creditor from impairment in the value of its interest, whereas superpriority is intended to recapture value that was unexpectedly lost during the course of a case. Thus, "the superpriority is born when adequate protection fails," and only applies to declines in value that could and probably would have been prevented or mitigated, but for the stay. The court then considered whether creditor was entitled to superpriority for each loss of value, concluding that creditor was not entitled to superpriority for loss attributable to error in the parties' stipulation, but was entitled to superpriority for losses attributable to uninsured loss, market forces, and depreciation through use of the collateral. However, since depreciation was a factor taken into account in the interim payments required by the parties' stipulation, the court held that the amount of that loss for which creditor would receive superpriority would be limited to the total of the required stipulated payments until the stay was lifted, less the amount of payments that were actually made. Finally, the court rejected creditor's contention that its superpriority precluded payment of attorney's fees until it's claim was paid, holding that fees "may" be paid on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. § 331, which creates a rebuttable presumption that they will be paid, despite the existence of a superpriority.

Chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid debtor's transfer of his wholly owned residence to his son and daughter-in-law, claiming the transfer was fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) and Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-4. After losing his case at trial, trustee moved for a new trial, asserting that the court had applied the wrong burden of proof. The court held that the burden of proof had been properly placed on trustee, that trustee's failure to object to the court's jury instruction on that issue constituted a waiver, and that the facts of the case supported not shifting the burden to the defendants.

Creditor, with a claim wholly secured by chapter 11 debtor's real property, sought relief from stay to foreclose its interest. The debt owed to creditor equaled approximately 93% of the value of the property, and was increasing at the rate of approximately $8,000 per month, in interest. The court found that the property's value was stable, but that creditor's "equity cushion" would dissipate within a year due to the interest. Creditor asserted that these facts left it without the adequate protection that would be provided by an equity cushion. The court, noting that "adequate protection" was not defined in the Code, found it to be dependent on the factual circumstances of each case and, while an equity cushion may be helpful to adequate protection, it does not define it. The facts before the court were that the property was necessary to debtor's reorganization, creditor was a first lien holder, and had ample collateral to cover its debt. Therefore, creditor was adequately protected and was not entitled to relief from stay.

The court considered a claim for alimony and child support by chapter 13 debtor's ex-wife, which is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), and is excepted from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(2) to the extent that recovery is sought from non-estate property. After confirmation of debtor's plan, ex-wife obtained a judgment in state court for past alimony and child support, which she sought to collect. Debtor moved for an order to show cause, and the court identified the issue before it as what property was not estate property that could be executed on by ex-wife while the stay was in place. The court concluded that virtually no property remains property of the debtor in a chapter 13 proceeding, prior to confirmation, since even property within debtor's possession and control and exempt property are considered to be estate property in a chapter 13. However, unless the plan or confirmation order provides otherwise, plan confirmation re-vests all of the estate property in the debtor. The court suggested that chapter 13 debtors might want to include full payment of non-dischargeable debts to ex-spouses in their plans, thereby relieving the ex-spouses from pursuing collection outside of the bankruptcy, and providing monitoring of their payments by the trustee.