You are here


The District of Utah offers a database of opinions for the years 1979 to Current, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.

Opinion Archive

Click here to view the Court's Opinions in reverse Chronological order.

Title: In re Liquid Transport, Inc. | Date: Oct-7-1983 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Allen) | Case(s): 82A-1715

Former chairman of chapter 11 creditors committee submitted an application for reimbursement of his time and expenses, as an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D). Finding that chairman had significantly expedited and furthered the proceedings, the court allowed his expenses. However, noting that § 503(b)(3)(D) provides reimbursement for expenses but does not provide compensation for services, the court denied chairman's compensation claim.

Title: In re Mounteer | Date: Oct-7-1983 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 81A-2157

Chapter 13 debtors proposed a plan that paid secured creditors first, general unsecured claims second, and priority claims under 11 U.S.C. § 507 last, and the IRS objected. The court determined that 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) requires full payment of § 507 priority claims, but does not require payment of those claims in any particular order. However, relying on § 1322(b)(1), the court ruled that unsecured claims may be treated differently, under certain circumstances, so long as the different treatment does not result in unfair discrimination. Applying the four-part test in In re Wolff, 22 B.R. 510 (9th Cir. BAP 1982), the court concluded that debtor's failure to offer a reasonable basis for the discrimination prevented them from establishing Wolff's acceptable discrimination factors. The court then suggested that concurrent payment of the IRS and other unsecured creditors, on a pro rata basis, would likely not be discriminatory under § 1322(b)(1).

Title: In re Read | Date: Sep-20-1983 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 81C-1756

Where chapter 7 debtor failed to list creditor's claim in time for timely filing of a proof of claim, the court held that claim to be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3).

Title: In re Jones, 32 B.R. 951 (Bankr.D.Utah) | Date: Sep-16-1983 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 82C-0407

Chapter 11 debtor proposed a plan providing that allowed secured claims in default would receive deferred cure and compensation payments, which debtor asserted would leave those claims unimpaired pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2). The payments were to commence 30 days after the plan's effective date. The court questioned whether cure and compensation payments under § 1124(2) could be deferred, even if sufficient interest was added to compensate for the deferral. The court considered two approaches to determining impairment, which were (1) strict construction of § 1124(1) and (2), such that a plan that alters rights in any way not expressly permitted by those provisions is considered an impairment; and (2) scrutinizing the protections offered by § 1129(b) to determine impairment only as necessary to prevent wrongs. The court found that debtor's plan left the secured claims "impaired" under both approaches, and held that cure and compensation payments must be completed by the effective date of the plan to avoid impairment.

Title: In re Laita | Date: Sep-16-1983 | Status: UNPUBLISHED See 98.pdf (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 82C-0322

Adopting its own decision in In re Jones, 32 B.R. 951 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) [98.pdf], the court ruled that all creditor classes that did not receive full cure and compensation payments required by 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) on or before the plan's effective date were impaired.

Title: Bingham v. Martensen (In re Martensen) | Date: Sep-11-1983 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 82PM-1228

Shortly before filing his chapter 13 petition, debtor and plaintiff entered into a contract in which debtor agreed to serve as plaintiff's sales manager as an independent contractor. Plaintiff filed an adversary proceeding in debtor's bankruptcy asserting various claims arising out of their contract. Debtor moved to dismiss, claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, debtor requested that the court abstain from hearing the dispute. The court ruled that resolution of the jurisdiction issue was unnecessary because abstention was appropriate, as debtor had already made the final payment on his plan. Since the outcome of plaintiff's claims would therefore have no effect on the administration of debtor's plan, the motion to dismiss was granted.

Title: In re Bastien | Date: Aug-4-1983 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 83C-0225

Chapter 7 debtors were ordered by the court to pay their tax refunds and wages to the trustee. Debtors failed to comply and, instead, filed a petition under chapter 13. The chapter 13 petition was dismissed for debtors' failure to file schedules, and debtors filed a second chapter 13 petition. On trustee's motion, the court dismissed debtors' chapter 7 case, with prejudice. Debtors then moved to "cancel" their chapter 7 case in order to include the claims in that case in their pending chapter 13. The court ruled that debtors had not shown cause to vacate the chapter 7 dismissal, and ordered debtors to show cause why their chapter 13 case should not be dismissed as an abusive filing.

Title: Anderson v. Stacey (In re Anderson) | Date: Jul-28-1983 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 81PC-0674

Defendant had obtained a judgment against debtor/husband, and his lien attached to real property jointly owned by husband, wife, and husband's mother. Defendant foreclosed his lien, and purchased husband's interest in the property in the foreclosure sale. Prior to expiration of husband's six-month redemption period under state law, husband and wife filed their chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Husband died shortly thereafter. In wife's adversary proceeding, the court held that the automatic stay had tolled the running of the redemption period. The court then considered whether the joint tenancy between husband, wife, and mother had been severed by the sheriff's sale, and concluded that an execution purchaser does not acquire title to the property until after the redemption period. Therefore, when husband died during the bankruptcy, his interest in the property automatically passed to his wife and mother. Finally, the court held that wife could avoid defendant's lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) because it impaired the homestead exemption provided her by Utah law.

Title: In re Pace | Date: Jul-28-1983 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 83C-0198

Chapter 7 debtor was discharged in a prior chapter 7 case. Post-discharge, debtor and creditor entered into a reaffirmation agreement regarding creditor's debt, and creditor later obtained a default judgment against debtor in state court, based on non-payment under the agreement. In this chapter 7, the court ruled that the reaffirmation agreement was invalid because the protections mandated by 11 U.S.C. § 524 were not provided. Creditor did not respond to the court's order to file briefs regarding the effect of the state court judgment, and its claim was therefore disallowed, and the state court judgment ruled void. Creditor was ordered to return to debtor any amounts collected pursuant to that judgment.

Title: Weatherston v. Fairbourn (In re Fairbourn) | Date: Jul-28-1983 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 81P-0498

The court entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor on their non-dischargeability claim against debtor. More than a year later, debtor sought relief from that judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), asserting that his trial counsel had committed malpractice. The court denied the motion, concluding that debtor's 14-month delay in seeking relief was not a "reasonable time" within which such a motion must be made. Moreover, debtor had not alleged facts that would justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6), even if his claim had been timely, and any claim debtor might have that was based on his attorney's malpractice would have to be pursued against the attorney in a separate action. In the action between plaintiffs and debtor, any neglect by debtor's attorney would be attributable to debtor.