Before the court were three debtors' motions, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327, to employ the same counsel in separate chapter 11 cases. Due to existing prepetition debts between the debtors, the court found an actual conflict that rendered the attorney an "interested" party within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(E), and thus subject to disqualification under § 327(a). Further, as the conflict was actual with the specific debtors, rather than simply hypothetical or theoretical, disqualification was mandatory and the motions to employ were denied.
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Title: In re Green Street, 132 B.R. 460 (Bankr.D.Utah) | Date: Aug-13-1991 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Allen) | Case(s): 91A-3794
Title: Richard L. Clissold Inv. Co. v. Valley Bank & Trust Co. (In re Richard L. Clissold Inv. Co.) | Date: Aug-7-1991 | Status: UNPUBLISHED (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 90PC-0323
Debtor brought this adversary action, claiming that defendant creditor was obligated to apply the fair market value of debtor's properties to its notes, and that its refusal to do so constituted conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. Creditor counterclaimed, asserting that, since the fair market value of the properties at issue had yet to be determined, it should be allowed three months after any award of money to debtor in which to pursue a deficiency judgment. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that: (1) Debtor/plaintiff asserted a jury demand in its adversary complaint but failed to request a withdrawal of reference, which constituted a waiver of the jury demand. (2) Under Utah law, when a secured creditor sells collateral securing a debt in a non-judicial sale, the creditor must commence a deficiency action, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32, in order to preserve its claim for a deficiency. (3) However, since creditor's notes were secured by more than one property, creditor was not required to commence a deficiency action until three months after the last property securing that specific debt is sold. On one of creditor's notes, one of the properties securing the note had not yet been sold, and creditor was not precluded by § 57-1-32 from filing a deficiency action. On creditor's other note, however, all properties had been sold and the three-month period had run, which precluded creditor from filing a deficiency action on that note, whether or not the fair market values of those properties had been determined.
Title: In re Smith, 130 B.R. 102 (Bankr.D.Utah) | Date: Jul-16-1991 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Allen) | Case(s): 88A-2388
The issue before the court was whether the debtors' 36-month chapter 13 plan satisfied the good faith requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3), where the plan proposed a 30% return to unsecured creditors on their claims. Both the trustee and the lender on a student loan objected to the proposed plan. The court determined that the student loan debt would not have been dischargeable in a chapter 7 case, but that a chapter 13 discharge is much broader. Because of that, § 1325(a)(3) requires that a chapter 13 plan be proposed in good faith. As the Bankruptcy Code does not define "good faith," the court found it essential to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the proposed plan, including debtors' income prospects and the length of the plan. Concluding that debtor husband's education had enabled him to earn an income that was likely to include substantial increases, the court held that a 60-month plan was imperative for the debtors to meet the good faith requirement for confirmation.
Title: In re Swenson, 130 B.R. 99 (Bankr.D.Utah) | Date: Jul-11-1991 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Allen) | Case(s): 90A-24222
Debtor's IRA accounts were subject to a prepetition writ of garnishment, but debtor claimed the accounts as exempt property in his chapter 7 bankruptcy. The judgment creditor objected and moved for relief from the automatic stay, asserting it held a perfected lien on the accounts. The court determined that, in order to be exempt under Utah law (Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6(3)), an account must be "an annuity or other similar plan," and that most courts had ruled that IRA accounts were not exempt under similar statutes. Noting that public policy concerns dictate whether a particular trust fund may be exempted from a bankruptcy estate, the court determined that it would be unjust to allow debtors to frustrate the rights of their creditors by claiming that accounts to which they have easy access are "annuities or other similar plans." Therefore, the court granted creditor's motion for relief from stay, finding it "clear" that IRAs were not exempt property under Utah law.
Title: Placer U.S., Inc. v. Dahlstrom, 129 B.R. 240 (Bankr.D.Utah) | Date: Jul-3-1991 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 90PC-0678
In an adversary proceeding seeking non-dischargeability, under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), of a state court award of compensatory and punitive damages against debtor, the court previously ruled that debtor was collaterally estopped from re-litigating both the non-dischargeability of the compensatory damages and that the punitive damage award was based on "willful and malicious injury" of plaintiff. Four minority arguments to the effect that § 523's non-dischargeability provisions are inapplicable to punitive damages were considered and rejected by the court. In doing so, the court noted that it had previously held, along with a minority of other courts, that punitive damage awards were subject to discharge. However, the court felt compelled to reevaluate that position after the U.S. Supreme Court, in Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991), included punitive damages in the amount determined to be non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(2). The bankruptcy court concluded that punitive damages may be non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6), and that the punitive damage award against debtor in the case before it was non-dischargeable.
Title: Alside Supply Ctr. v. Aste (In re Aste), 129 B.R. 1012 (Bankr.D.Utah) | Date: Jun-11-1991 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Boulden) | Case(s): 89PB-0695
Creditor brought a non-dischargeability action against the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 523(b)(2)(B), based on a line of credit that had been granted on the basis of a materially false financial statement. Debtor had signed the financial statement as vice president of a small non-party corporation, and had personally guaranteed the corporation's debt. In response to Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991), the court expressed a need to reconcile the newly imposed preponderance of the evidence standard in non-dischargeability cases with its obligation to narrowly construe exceptions to dischargeability in favor of the debtor. The court held that, since strict construction is applicable to statutory interpretation rather than to evidentiary burden, that standard was therefore unaffected by Grogan's change of the evidentiary standard. Applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, the court found that plaintiff had not established either that debtor had actual knowledge that the financial statement he signed, which had been prepared by another corporate employee, was false, or that his signing of the document had been reckless. Without proof of either actual intent to defraud or reckless disregard of the truth, the court concluded that plaintiff had failed to establish that its claim against debtor was non-dischargeable under § 523(b)(2)(B).
Title: In re Fullmer | Date: May-9-1991 | Status: APPEAL Unpublished See 306.pdf (U.S. District Court, Utah) | Case(s): 89B-6063
Debtors appealed a bankruptcy court ruling that an ERISA retirement fund was an asset of debtors' estate and was not exempt under either federal or Utah law, within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A). The district court noted, first, that debtors could not avail themselves of the otherwise applicable exemption in § 522(d)(10)(E), both because Utah is an opt-out state, and because § 522(d) exemptions are excluded from the federal exemptions that debtors may claim under § 522(b)(2)(A). The court further determined that the Utah statutory exemptions on which debtors had relied were "related to" ERISA, and therefore preempted by that Act. The bankruptcy court ruling was affirmed.
Title: Bagley v. United States (In re Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co. of Utah) | Date: May-1-1991 | Status: UNPUBLISHED See 328.pdf & 361.pdf (Judge Boulden) | Case(s): 90PB-0601
The government filed claims against the estate based on government contracts with the debtor. Trustee filed this adversary proceeding objecting to the claims. Finding the case of In re Gary Aircraft Corp., 698 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1983) to be instructive, the court discussed primary jurisdiction and discretionary deferral of government contract claims disputes. The court concluded that deferral would unduly delay administration of the estate and denied the government's motion to dismiss or defer.
Title: In re Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co. of Utah | Date: Apr-30-1991 | Status: UNPUBLISHED See 361.pdf (Judge Boulden) | Case(s): B-75-484
In this Bankruptcy Act Chapter XI case, trustee argued entitlement to partial summary judgment on a claim filed by the United States for unliquidated progress payments. In response to trustee's motion, the government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, or to defer resolution of the disputes to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the U.S. Claims Court. Finding that no unliquidated progress payments had survived the ruling in Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court granted trustee's partial summary judgment motion and denied the government's motion.
Title: In re Packham, 126 B.R. 603 (Bankr.D.Utah) | Date: Apr-26-1991 | Status: PUBLISHED (Judge Clark) | Case(s): 90C-4129
Upon objections by trustee and an unsecured creditor, the court refused to confirm debtors' proposed Chapter 13 plan, and dismissed their case, on the ground that debtors had not devoted all of their disposable income to plan payments, as is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). After debtors testified regarding their expenses, the court concluded that all of the listed expenses were reasonably necessary for the support of debtors or their dependents, with the exception of a monthly tithing payment to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. The court adopted the view that, although church donations may be a source of strength and comfort to some debtors, they do not satisfy the reasonably necessary for maintenance or support requirement of § 1325(b)(2)(A).