Relying on 11 U.S.C. §547(b) and 550(a), chapter 11 trustee sought to avoid and recover loan payments made by debtor during the one-year period preceding the filing of its petition. The bankruptcy court ruled that, as the transfers did not satisfy the criteria of § 547(b)(5), they were not preferential, and trustee appealed. The parties stipulated that the debt on which the payments were made was over-secured during the preference period and, therefore, the lien-holder had not received more from the payments than it would have received from liquidation of the collateral, as is required for avoidance under § 547(b)(5). However, the district court relied on a case law exception to the over-secured rule, which is that payments on an over-secured property may still be preferential if the payments are not accompanied by the release of an equivalent value to the estate. The district court then found that the loan payments had not been accompanied by release of an equivalent value, since the loan had been made to a joint venture, of which debtor was only a 50% owner. Therefore, the benefit to debtor was only 50% of the amount of the payments made. The district court rejected lender's argument that it could impose a junior lien on the property for the 50% of the payments that debtor had made on behalf of the other joint-venturer, concluding that such a lien was potentially valueless. Accordingly, the payments were held to have been preferential, and the bankruptcy court's order denying trustee's avoidance claim was reversed.

Chapter 7 debtor listed an automobile personal injury claim, which he valued at $25,000, as an asset of his estate and claimed it as exempt under Utah law. The court identified three Issues: 1) whether debtor was bound by a subrogation agreement executed by his mother in favor of the health plan that covered both her and debtor; 2) whether the asset that debtor claimed to be exempt constituted "compensatory damages," as provided by the Utah exemption statute; and 3) whether the claimed exemption was preempted by the subrogation provisions of an ERISA-qualified plan. The court concluded that the subrogation provisions were binding upon the debtor, who ratified the subrogation terms by knowingly accepting benefit payments under the plan and failing to take any action in four years to disaffirm his mother's execution of the agreement. The court also determined that proceeds from debtor's personal injury claim would be considered "compensatory damages," which were exempt under the Utah Exemptions Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1)(i)). However, relying on In re Martin, 115 B.R. 311 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990) aff'd sub nom. In re Fullmer, 127 B.R. 55 (D. Utah 1991), the court concluded that, because the exemption statute "related" to an ERISA-qualified plan, it was preempted by the provisions of that plan. Therefore, debtor's exemption was allowed, over the trustee's objection, but only to the extent that the recovery exceeded the amount of the ERISA plan's subrogation claim.

Creditor filed a state court action seeking to foreclose its interest in defendant's Utah real property. Defendant removed the case to Utah federal district court and, approximately two years later, filed a chapter 11 petition in California. Creditor moved for relief of stay in California, in order to proceed with the foreclosure action in Utah, and that motion had been granted by the California bankruptcy court. After the stay relief order was signed, but before it was entered, defendant/debtor obtained the Utah district court's referral of the Utah foreclosure action, as an ancillary action, to the Utah bankruptcy court. Creditor moved the Utah bankruptcy court to remand the case back to the district court, while defendant/debtor moved to transfer venue from the Utah bankruptcy court to the California bankruptcy court. Considering the equities of the case, the court concluded, based in large part on the California bankruptcy court's order allowing creditor to proceed with the Utah foreclosure action, that the case would more appropriately be decided by the Utah district court than by the California bankruptcy court. Creditor's case was remanded to the district court, with a recommendation that the district court deny the motion for change of venue.

In a jointly administered case, professionals sought compensation for services from the estates of the chapter 11 debtors-in-possession. The court held that time reasonably spent preparing fee applications is compensable at normal hourly rates, and is neither subject to a percentage limitation nor an across-the-board discount, provided that the estate is billed only for time spent (1) preparing the fee application pleading, including the narrative section, at the
lowest applicable hourly rate; (2) exercising billing judgment while reviewing the application; and (3) responding to objections and attending the hearing on allowance of the fee application. Customary overhead charges such as reviewing time records for accuracy, posting accumulated time records, and compiling the billing statement, are non-compensable charges. The court also held that, if services provided to the estate by a paraprofessional are clerical in nature and would traditionally be charged to overhead in a non-bankruptcy case, they are non-compensable. Finally, the court found that telecopier charges should reflect the actual cost to the estate of long distance telephone rates and supplies and should not produce a profit for the applicant.