The Chapter 13 Trustee and PNC Bank moved to dismiss the Debtor's Chapter 13 case because his secured debts exceeded the $1,149,525 limit imposed by § 109(e). The Court found, despite the Debtor's objections, that the motions were timely, PNC had standing to file proofs of claim, and those claims were prima facie valid. Following the § 109(e) analysis prescribed by Kanke v. Adams (In re Adams), 373 B.R. 116 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007), the Court reviewed the Debtor's schedules and PNC's proofs of claim and found that the facial amount of his debts surpassed the statutory threshold. The Court held that neither a dispute over liability on the debts nor the Debtor's assertion of offsets against PNC rendered his debts unliquidated, and the Court ruled that the debt limit of § 109(e) did not violate the Debtor's due process rights. The Court therefore dismissed the Debtor's case.

Debtor filed a chapter 13 plan, which was neither novel or complex. The plan provided for payment of a prepetition arrearage to an oversecured creditor. A dispute arose between debtor and creditor over the amount of the prepetition arrearage and, at the court's urging, the parties negotiated a settlement. After reaching the settlement, creditor filed a motion under § 506(b) for allowance of postpetition attorney's fees in the amount of $24,647.50. Debtor objected arguing that the fees sought by creditor were unnecessary, that creditor did not act reasonably or prudently and the time expended by creditor"s counsel was excessive, not adequately described, and that many services were duplicative. The Court found that § 506(b) awards were controlled by federal law and that a lodestar approach to allowance of a § 506(b) claims should be followed using a two step approach: 1) were the services were necessary to protect the creditor's legitimate interests ?; and 2) were the fees sought for the legal services reasonable? The Court allowed some, but not all of the fees requested and applied nine factors to weigh the necessity and the reasonableness of the fee request.

As a matter of first impression, the Court considered a creditor's motion to dismiss a chapter 7 case for bad faith under § 707(a). The creditor argued that "cause" for dismissal under § 707(a) encompassed a debtor's bad faith, and that the Court should dismiss this case because the facts showed that the debtor was not acting in good faith. In support of its position, the creditor pointed to the three bankruptcy cases the debtor had been in during a period of under four years, inconsistencies in information placed on the various Statements of Financial Affairs and Schedules and what it considered a dearth of creditors. The Court determined that a chapter 7 case may be dismissed for lack of good faith. However, applying the factors found in In re O'Brien, from the bankruptcy court of the W.D.N.Y., the Court found under a totality of circumstances that the evidence did not support dismissal.

The debtors' proposed plan failed to provide for all projected disposable income as required by § 1325(b)(1)(B), particularly tax refunds received during the applicable commitment period. Pursuant to Skougard, 438 B.R. 738 (Bankr. D. Utah 2010), tax refunds in excess of $1,000 or up to $2,000, if a debtor receives certain tax credits, are surrendered to the Trustee. The debtors proposed to include an annualized amount on Schedule I for tax refunds and retain all refunds over the course of the plan. However, the Court noted the debtors' employment had changed prior to filing and the annualization of tax refunds skewed the refund amount. Additionally, because of the difficulty in predicting actual tax liabilities the Court found that the current practice was more accurate and fairer to all parties and did not allow annualization of tax refunds.