The Debtor proposed a Chapter 13 plan in which he sought to bifurcate the secured claims of two different creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). These creditors had provided financing to the Debtor within the previous year that allowed him to purchase two semi-tractors used in his business. The Debtor argued that the hanging paragraph of § 1325(a) requires that a creditor whose collateral consists of “any other thing of value” purchased within one year of filing can only avoid having its secured claim crammed down under § 506(a)(1) if it has a purchase money interest in the collateral. Furthermore, the Debtor argued that a creditor can never have a purchase money security interest in a motor vehicle in Utah. The Court found that the hanging paragraph does require a creditor whose collateral consists of “any other thing of value” to have a purchase money security interest in the collateral to avoid the cram down of its secured claim. The Court also found that the Utah Uniform Commercial Code regulates the creation of security interests in motor vehicles in Utah meaning that Creditors can have purchase money security interests in motor vehicles. The Debtor's objections were overruled and his plan was denied confirmation without prejudice.

In this case, the Court was called upon to determine the scope of the phrase "unsecured creditors" in the context of Section 1325(b)(1)(B) relating to confirmation of a chapter 13 plan. That section provides that upon objection to confirmation by a party in interest, the Court may confirm a debtor's proposed chapter 13 plan only if the debtor proposes to pay unsecured creditors in full, or proposes to pay the debtor's projected disposable income for the applicable commitment period to "unsecured creditors." The Debtors in this case urged the Court to adopt the plain language of §1325(b)(1)(B). They contended that the phrase "unsecured creditors" refers to both priority and non-priority unsecured creditors which resulted in a lower payment to the unsecured creditors. The chapter 13 Trustee disagreed and objected to the plan.The Court declined to enforce the plain language of section 1325(b)(1)(B) because that interpretation conflicts with manifest Congressional intent, and would bring an absurd result. The Court concluded that the reference in section 1325(b)(1)(B) to "unsecured creditors" refers to non-priority unsecured creditors only, requiring the Debtors' proposed chapter 13 plan to return to non-priority unsecured creditors at least the amount calculated on Form B22C, which in this case would be a much greater amount than proposed. Since the Debtors' proposed plan did not comply with this requirement, the Court held that the Debtors' proposed plan did not meet the requirements of section 1325(b)(1)(B) and was not confirmable.

Creditor filed adversary to have creditor's debt excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2), but filed the adversary proceeding after debtor had been issued a discharge and after debtor's case had been closed. Creditor served a summons and complaint upon debtor after closure of Debtor's case as well. Debtor did not file an answer to the summons and complaint or otherwise defend. Creditor submitted an application for default judgment and the matter came before the court on hearing. Creditor argues that under Knotrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004). Creditor is entitled to a default judgment because Debtor failed to assert Creditor's late filing of the adversary proceeding as an affirmative defense. Creditor argued that service upon Debtor was effective because the debtor is an individual and that service upon individuals is governed by F.R.B.P. 7004(b)(1). The Court held that service of process upon a debtor is governed by Rule 7004(b)(9) rather than Rule 7004(b)(1), that Creditor's service upon the Debtor was ineffective because the Debtor's case was closed at the time that Debtor was served with the summons and complaint, and that Creditor must reopen debtor's case in order to effectuate service of process upon the Debtor under Rule 7004(b)(9).

The Chapter 11 trustee brought an adversary proceeding against certain members of Geneva's Board of Directors alleging breach of duty of care, breach of duty of good faith, breach of duty of loyalty and breach of fiduciary duty. Two of the defendants filed a motion with the Court to have the trustee's causes of action declared as "non-core" matters under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3). Both of the moving directors had filed proofs of claim in the Geneva bankruptcy proceeding. An element of the Director's proofs of claim included an indemnity claim asserting claimant's rights to be indemnified, defended, or held harmless by Geneva for any liability that may arise from the Director's service on the Board of Directors. Upon being served with the trustee's complaint, both directors filed a counterclaim in the adversary proceeding asserting their indemnification rights. The Court ruled that the causes of action in the trustee's adversary proceeding against the directors were a compulsory counterclaims to the director's proofs of claim and the Court ruled that the director's counterclaims were compulsory counterclaims to the causes of action brought by the trustee in the adversary proceeding. The Court held that under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(O), the causes of action asserted by the trustee are "core" matters.