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Opinions
| Case Title | Date & Status | Case Number(s) | Judge & PDF | Summary | |
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Irwin v. Arrowsmith (In re Arrowsmith) (Internal Ref: Opinion 288) |
Jul-27-1989 UNPUBLISHED |
88PB-0699 |
Judge Boulden |
Prior to filing his chapter 7 petition, debtor and his law partners accepted and guaranteed loans to their law firm by a firm client. Until the funds were received by the firm, debtor did not realize that client was the source of the funds. Client filed a complaint in debtor's bankruptcy seeking non-dischargeability of the loan debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) and (6). With respect to § 523(a)(6), client attempted to impute another law firm member's knowledge of the transaction details to debtor. However, the court held that non-dischargeability under that provision requires the debtor's actual knowledge and, therefore, imputed knowledge was insufficient to satisfy client's burden of proof. Regarding § 523(a)(4), the court held that client must establish that debtor was the trustee of an intentionally created trust, and had control of a trust res. The court concluded that client had failed to establish non-dischargeability under § 523(a)(4) as well, because no fiduciary capacity had been established, and the breach involved was not a breach of trust but, instead, was a breach of a contractual obligation to pay. Although debtor violated a disciplinary rule applicable to attorneys' business dealings with clients, client failed to establish both a clearly defined trust res and an intent to create a trust relationship. | |
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Tradex, Inc. v. Volvo White Truck Corp. (In re IML Freight, Inc.) (Internal Ref: Opinion 287) |
Jul-17-1989 APPEAL Unpublished |
84PC-0844 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
Plaintiff, on behalf of debtor, filed a complaint against defendant seeking recovery of prepetition freight charges for debtor's transportation of goods for defendant. Based on stipulated facts, including that defendant had a valid prepetition claim against debtor that exceeded the valid freight charges, the bankruptcy court concluded that defendant's offset was precluded by the Interstate Commerce Act, which limits defenses that may be asserted in response to a claim for freight charges. Debtor argued that, since defendant had not raised any of the defenses under that Act, it could not claim an offset in the adversary proceeding and was limited to filing a proof of claim in the bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court agreed, and defendant appealed. The district court reversed, holding that 11 U.S.C. § 553 preserved defendant's offset claim in the bankruptcy. Since 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) precludes a turnover of debt that is subject to offset, defendant was entitled to assert its offset claim in defense of plaintiff's turnover claim. | |
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In re Sedgwick (Internal Ref: Opinion 284) |
Jul-7-1989 UNPUBLISHED |
84C-1985 |
Judge Clark |
Debtors claimed that income tax refunds were "disposable earnings" that are subject to exemption under Utah law, and the chapter 7 trustee objected. Relying on Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974), the court concluded that income tax returns are not disposable earnings and, therefore, could not be exempted from the debtors' estate. | |
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In re Turner, 101 B.R. 751 (Bankr.D.Utah) (Internal Ref: Opinion 286) |
Jul-7-1989 PUBLISHED |
88C-5093 |
Judge Clark |
The court considered whether homeowner fees assessed after the filing of debtor's chapter 7 petition were a debt for which debtor had been released from personal liability by her chapter 7 discharge. Debtor listed the homeowners' association and its prepetition debt in her bankruptcy schedules, and indicated her intent to surrender the property from which the fees arose. The court determined that the association's claim against debtor for her proportionate share of common expenses had arisen when debtor purchased the property, and her obligation continued until she no longer owned the property. Thus, although the association's right to postpetition fees was unmatured and contingent when debtor's petition was filed, it was still a prepetition obligation that was discharged in debtor's bankruptcy. In this respect, the court specifically disagreed with a line of cases from the district of Colorado bankruptcy court. | |
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Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks (In re Cascade Energy & Metals Corp.) (Internal Ref: Opinion 285) |
Jul-7-1989 UNPUBLISHED |
88PC-0861 |
Judge Clark |
Defendants were awarded a monetary judgment and an equitable lien on debtor's California property by the Utah federal district court, which they recorded in California. Debtor appealed the district court judgment and provided a supersedeas bond that was acceptable to the Utah court. The bankruptcy court determined that a federal judgment could only be perfected and enforced in another state when it became final by appeal or by expiration of the time for appeal, and it then must be registered in the appropriate district court in the state in which its enforcement is sought. Under California law, recording of a document that does not qualify for recording does not provide constructive notice of its existence or its terms. As the lien was not properly perfected, the court concluded that it was subject to avoidance by the chapter 11 debtor-in-possession. | |
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In re Caldwell, 101 B.R. 728 (Bankr.D.Utah) (Internal Ref: Opinion 283) |
Jun-9-1989 PUBLISHED |
88B-7175 |
Judge Boulden |
Creditor moved for relief from stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), and for conversion of debtor's chapter 12 case to a chapter 7 case, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1208(d). The court held that sufficient cause did not exist to grant relief from stay, because creditor had not shown that it had or would suffer harm unless the stay was lifted. In considering § 1208(d), the court held that proof of fraud by clear and convincing evidence was required. The court then found from the evidence that debtor's failure to list assets in his chapter 12 statements and his failure to amend the statement to list assets accurately was intentional and constituted a continued pattern of concealment. Because chapter 12 debtors are given wide latitude in producing and effectuating their plans, with no court-approved disclosure statement, the court held that full disclosure by the debtor has a significantly expanded role in those cases. Finding that debtor's material misstatement of estate assets, coupled with his failure to amend the asset statement when omissions were discovered, indicated an intent to defraud the court and the creditors, the court granted creditor's motion to convert the case to chapter 7. | |
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Walker v. Wilde (In re Walker) (Internal Ref: Opinion 282) |
Jun-8-1989 APPEAL 103 B.R. 281 (D.Utah) |
89PB-0668 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
Plaintiffs appealed a bankruptcy court order denying their request for relief from the post-discharge injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524. Plaintiffs sought to recover from the Utah Real Estate Recovery Fund ("Fund") based on debtor's alleged fraud as a realtor. The district court held that, since recovery from the Fund required a final judgment against the realtor, such recovery would violate the § 524 injunction and prejudice debtor's fresh start, concluding that the bankruptcy court had correctly applied a higher standard to motions for relief from the post-discharge injunction than is applied to motions for relief from the automatic stay. The district court also held that the bankruptcy court properly denied plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time to file an objection to dischargeability of their claim, based on In re Green, 876 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1989). The bankruptcy court's decision was affirmed. | |
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Am. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Weber (In re Weber), 99 B.R. 1001 (Bankr.D.Utah) (Internal Ref: Opinion 281) |
Apr-7-1989 PUBLISHED |
87PB-0790 |
Judge Boulden |
Bank filed complaint against chapter 7 debtors, claiming that its debt should be non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) and (6), and that debtors' discharge should be denied under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) and (7). Bank's claims arose from postpetition improper use of its cash collateral by debtor husband's wholly owned trucking company, in its own chapter 11 bankruptcy. The court held that the trucking company, as a debtor-in-possession, was a fiduciary of a statutory trust imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 1107. The court further found that debtor husband completely controlled the closely held corporation, while debtor wife did not. Therefore, husband was liable for any breach of fiduciary duty by the corporation, but wife was not. Finally, the court found that the corporation's dissipation of bank's cash collateral, which resulted in a substantial loss to bank, was a defalcation under § 523(a)(4) that warranted a non-dischargeable judgment in bank's favor against debtor husband, as well as a general denial of debtor husband's discharge. | |
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Fed. Savings and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Smith (In re LittleTree Inns-Layton, Inc.) (Internal Ref: Opinion 280) |
Apr-3-1989 APPEAL Unpublished |
88PC-0018 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
The district court considered, on interlocutory appeal, whether the bankruptcy court erred in deciding that creditor's cause of action to recover funds that were transferred by debtor-in-possession to its attorney, allegedly in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2), was a core bankruptcy proceeding. The district court concluded that the bankruptcy court had properly decided that creditor's cause of action was a core matter, since the claim asserted unauthorized use of cash collateral under the bankruptcy code. The district court also rejected appellant's argument that dismissal of the bankruptcy case should also have resulted in dismissal of the adversary proceeding, concluding that the underlying bankruptcy case was closed, rather than dismissed, and therefore the bankruptcy court had discretion to hear the adversary matter. Finally, the district court rejected appellant's claim that creditors cannot recover against third-parties under § 363(c)(2), concluding that a party whose rights were created by bankruptcy law may pursue violations of those rights in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court's order was affirmed. | |
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Scovill v. Beauty, Inc. (In re Scovill) (Internal Ref: Opinion 279) |
Mar-14-1989 UNPUBLISHED |
88PC-0929 |
Judge Clark |
Debtor filed an adversary proceeding against defendant, and defendant filed a motion for abstention, which debtor opposed. The court described the adversary proceeding, in which the parties' claims were essentially identical to ones they had asserted in a prepetition state court action, as a "garden-variety notes receivable action" based entirely on state law, and concluded that such actions were not core bankruptcy proceedings. Finding that all of the requisites of abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) had been satisfied, the court indicated that it believed abstention to be mandatory. Alternatively, the court concluded that, even if abstention was discretionary, an analysis of the factors in § 1334(c)(1) also led it to conclude that abstention was appropriate. The court submitted its decision as a report and recommendation to the district court. | |
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R.D. Bailey Rigging, Inc. v. United States (In re R.D. Bailey Rigging, Inc.) (Internal Ref: Opinion 278) |
Mar-10-1989 UNPUBLISHED |
87PB-0475 |
Judge Boulden |
For many years prior to its bankruptcy, debtor provided freight-hauling services to the United States, for which it was paid in accordance with bills of lading it submitted. The court was presented with debtor's claim that the United States had been undercharged for some services, and the United States' claim that it had been overcharged for some. Based on evidence presented in the adversary proceeding, the court ruled that debtor was entitled to recover some of its claimed undercharges, the United States was entitled to include all of its overcharges in its claim in debtor's bankruptcy, and the United States could setoff receivables of the debtor against the overcharges. | |
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In re Vasilacopulos (Internal Ref: Opinion 277) |
Mar-9-1989 APPEAL Unpublished |
82C-1031 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
Bankruptcy trustee, through its attorneys, filed an adversary proceeding against third party defendants, seeking to recover allegedly fraudulent transfers. The attorneys subsequently discovered that other members of their law firm had previously represented defendants. The potential conflict of interest was immediately disclosed, and both trustee and the defendants waived any conflict. Debtor later moved for removal of the law firm that represented trustee, claiming conflict of interest. Debtor also filed a motion to remove the bankruptcy trustee, claiming that inadequate notice had been given of the conversion of debtor's involuntary bankruptcy from chapter 7 to chapter 11. Both of debtor's motions were denied by the bankruptcy court, and debtor appealed. The district court held that the bankruptcy court had properly denied both of debtor's motions. | |
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Main Hurdman v. Anderson (In re Vasilacopulos) (Internal Ref: Opinion 276) |
Feb-6-1989 UNPUBLISHED See 259.pdf |
84PC-1094 |
Judge Clark |
The court previously ordered that bankruptcy trustee could recover amounts transferred by debtor to defendants, plus interest, as fraudulent conveyances under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2). That order was affirmed by the district court in 259.pdf. In this proceeding, the court determined the amounts trustee could recover from each defendant. The majority of defendants did not present evidence in opposition to trustee's claim against them, and the court found that trustee had sufficiently proven the amounts of each of those claims. The court then separately considered the evidence relating to trustee's claim against each defendant who disputed the claim against them. After determining the amount of each avoidable payment, the court concluded that trustee could recover interest on those amounts, at the rate applicable under Utah law as of the day trustee sent demand letters to defendants. | |
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BancBoston Fin. Co. v. Dunyon (In re Dunyon) (Internal Ref: Opinion 275) |
Jan-18-1989 UNPUBLISHED |
87PB-0960 |
Judge Boulden |
Bank filed a complaint against debtor seeking non-dischargeability, under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B), of a debt arising from debtor's personal guaranty of a loan that bank had made to a company controlled by debtor. The court denied bank's complaint on the ground that bank had failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the necessary elements of its claims. Although bank had established that the borrower had provided false information to bank with intent to defraud, bank had not sufficiently tied debtor to that false information to establish debtor's intent to defraud. Bank also failed to establish that it had reasonably relied on the false statements in lending money to the borrower. | |
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In re Dunyon (Internal Ref: Opinion 274) |
Dec-30-1988 APPEAL Unpublished See 251.pdf |
87B-4887 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
The bankruptcy court imposed sanctions under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) against creditor and its counsel for violating the bankruptcy automatic stay. On appeal, the district court concluded that the bankruptcy court's findings, to the effect that appellants had violated the stay by re-filing state court claims against debtor and debtor's companies, were not clearly erroneous. The district court noted, however, that not all of the fees awarded as sanctions were a direct, foreseeable consequence of appellants' actions. The matter was remanded to the bankruptcy court for recalculation of the sanctions amount. | |
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Rothey v. Shah (In re Shah) (Internal Ref: Opinion 273) |
Dec-13-1988 APPEAL Unpublished |
84PC-0059 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
Creditor claimed the debt owed it by chapter 7 debtor was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), but the bankruptcy court held that creditor's forbearance from calling his demand note did not constitute an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit within the meaning of § 523(a)(2). Creditor appealed, and the district court held that, if proven, a creditor's forbearance from demanding payment of a demand note, resulting from creditor's reliance on debtor's false statements, would constitute an extension of credit subject to § 523(a)(2). Since creditor had claimed that he did not demand payment because debtor provided him with false financial statements, his claim was that those statements allowed debtor to continue the parties' debtor-creditor relationship, which was an extension of credit subject to § 523(a)(2). The case was remanded to the bankruptcy court for determinations of fact with respect to whether debtor's statements were false and intended to deceive creditor and, if so, whether creditor's reliance on them was reasonable. | |
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Calder v. Segal (In re Calder), 94 B.R. 200 (Bankr.D.Utah) (Internal Ref: Opinion 272) |
Dec-8-1988 PUBLISHED |
88PA-0021 |
Judge Allen |
The Chapter 13 Trustee sent fee payments for legal services rendered by the chapter 7 debtor, an attorney, to debtor's chapter 7 trustee. Debtor filed an adversary proceeding against the chapter 7 trustee, in which he asserted that the legal fees were not property of the estate. Debtor argued that the fees were not estate property because payment of them had been contingent on confirmation of his clients' plans, and that the fees were therefore postpetition payments for services rendered, which belong to the debtor. The court considered 11 U.S.C. § 541, which defines property of the estate. Specifically, § 541(a)(6) includes "proceeds" of estate property within that definition, but excepts earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the petition was filed. The court concluded that all postpetition payments that were for services actually performed prepetition were "proceeds" of debtor's estate, and therefore property of the estate. | |
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Deseret Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. Brianhead Royale Dev. Corp. (In re Brianhead Royale Dev. Corp.) (Internal Ref: Opinion 271) |
Nov-29-1988 APPEAL Unpublished |
87PA-0063 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
In connection with appellee's motion to dismiss, the district court considered whether the notice of appeal was sufficient to provide it jurisdiction over the appeal. The district court found, first, that parties not named as appellants in the notice of appeal had forfeited their right to appeal. Next, the court determined that appellant sought only to appeal that portion of the bankruptcy court's order that granted partial summary judgment. Based on that finding, the court considered whether the appeal met the 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) standards for interlocutory appeals, concluding that it did not. The motion to dismiss the appeal was granted. | |
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Styler v. Tall Oaks, Inc. (In re Hatch), 93 B.R. 263 (Bankr.D.Utah) (Internal Ref: Opinion 270) |
Nov-21-1988 PUBLISHED |
87PA-0683 |
Judge Allen |
Trustee's attorney filed a complaint alleging a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 548, which defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that it had not been timely served with the complaint as required by Bankruptcy Rule 7004(a) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j). Those rules require that a complaint be served on the defendant within 120 days of its filing, unless good cause is established for failing to do so. Trustee's attorney admitted taking no steps to serve the complaint after filing it, claiming that he had filed the complaint based on summary information and, thereafter, attempted to obtain documentation from which he could prove the claims made. The court found that this explanation did not satisfy the standard of "good cause" for failing to serve the complaint, and that dismissal of the complaint was therefore mandatory, despite the fact that refiling would be barred by the statutory time period set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1). Based on the admissions by trustee's attorney, the court further held that the complaint had been filed for an improper purpose, which was to toll the § 546(a)(1) time period so that trustee could develop the evidence needed to prove the complaint's allegations. Therefore, the court determined that sanctions were mandatory under Bankruptcy Rule 9011, and awarded defendant all fees and costs it had incurred since the filing of the complaint, payable equally by trustee and her attorney. | |
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In re Calder, 93 B.R. 739 (Bankr.D.Utah) (Internal Ref: Opinion 268) |
Nov-18-1988 PUBLISHED |
86A-3558 |
Judge Allen |
Based on the unique facts of the case before it, the court denied debtor's one-time absolute right, under 11 U.S.C. § 706(a), to convert his chapter 7 bankruptcy to chapter 13, relying on its authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to take any action necessary or appropriate to prevent an abuse of process. | |
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In re Hofheins (Internal Ref: Opinion 269) |
Nov-18-1988 APPEAL Unpublished |
87C-6000 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
Creditor bank, with knowledge of chapter 12 debtors' pending bankruptcy, repossessed fence panels that were fixtures on debtors' property and were being used by the estate. The bankruptcy court awarded sanctions against bank for its violation of the automatic stay, in the amounts of $4,000 actual, and $10,000 punitive, damages. Bank appealed, and the district court affirmed, concluding that there was ample evidence before the bankruptcy court that justified imposition of sanctions, based on either 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) or 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). The district court determined that the bankruptcy court's finding that bank had willfully violated the stay was not clearly erroneous, and that the awards of actual and punitive damages were appropriate to the facts. The case was remanded for the bankruptcy court's consideration of whether debtors' appeal expenses should be added to the sanction awards. | |
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Billings v. Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd. (In re Granada, Inc.),92 B.R. 501 (Bankr.D.Utah) (Internal Ref: Opinion 267) |
Oct-28-1988 PUBLISHED |
87PC-0812 |
Judge Clark |
Chapter 11 trustee filed an adversary complaint against a limited partnership, of which debtor was the general partner, seeking to quiet title to a mobile home park and adjacent unimproved property. The partnership responded that, since it held equitable title to the subject real property, trustee's 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) right to stand in the shoes of a bona fide purchaser was limited by 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) to debtor's bare legal title. Therefore, the partnership argued, trustee lacked the power to avoid partnership's equitable interest under § 544. The court disagreed that § 541(d) limits trustee's avoidance powers, since § 541(d) relates only to property made part of the estate by § 541(a)(1) or (2), or to debtor's prepetition property; whereas property recovered pursuant to a trustee's avoidance powers becomes part of the bankruptcy estate through § 541(a)(3) or (4). Thus, a bankruptcy estate consists of both debtor's prepetition property and property that the trustee recovers by avoidance. In any event, the court concluded that, under Utah law, one with legal title could transfer that property to a bona fide purchaser free and clear of an unrecorded equitable interest. Partnership also claimed that trustee could not be a bona fide purchaser under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3), because partnership's actual, open, and unambiguous possession of the property when the petition was filed gave trustee inquiry notice, requiring him to investigate partnership's interest. However, the court found that the facts did not support partnership's claim, since nothing about the operation/possession of the property was in conflict with debtor's record title. | |
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Walker v. Wilde (In re Walker), 91 B.R. 968 (Bankr.D.Utah) (Internal Ref: Opinion 266) |
Sep-30-1988 PUBLISHED See 282.pdf |
88PB-0356 |
Judge Boulden |
In chapter 7 debtor's adversary proceeding against them for violating the automatic stay, creditors moved for annulment of the stay, relief from the discharge injunction, and either an order of non-dischargeability or an extension of time to file objections to dischargeability of their debt. The court held that creditors had failed to establish their claim that any violation by them of the automatic stay was only a good-faith technical violation. Therefore, creditors were not entitled to annul the stay in order to validate any technical violations of it. The court also concluded that, even if creditors' state court judgment against debtor, which was void because it was entered in violation of the automatic stay, were validated, the judgment's conclusions that debtor's actions constituted misrepresentations or deceptive practices were insufficient to support creditors' claim that debtor was precluded by collateral estoppel from challenging non-dischargeability of creditors' debt. Finally, debtor's failure to provide creditors' correct names and address in the bankruptcy, which caused them not to receive formal notice of debtor's petition filing, did not entitle creditors to an extension of time to object to dischargeability of their debt because creditors had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing. This decision was affirmed by the district court in 282.pdf. | |
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Job v. Calder (In re Calder), 93 B.R. 734 (Bankr.D.Utah) (Internal Ref: Opinion 265) |
Sep-27-1988 PUBLISHED See 907 F.2d 953 |
86PA-0989 |
Judge Allen |
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against chapter 7 debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A), alleging debtor failed to list property and to disclose bank accounts and partnership income in his schedules and statement of affairs. Debtor responded that the assets he failed to list were worthless or unavailable to creditors, and that he had revealed the assets to the trustee, both at the meeting of creditors and thereafter. The court held that deliberate omissions by a debtor may result in a denial of the debtor's discharge, and that debtor's assertions of lack of value were insufficient to relieve him from his duty to disclose all of his property interests in the bankruptcy. Additionally, debtor's alleged disclosures to the trustee were insufficient to satisfy his disclosure duty. Based on debtor's cumulative omissions, and the fact that debtor was an attorney professing knowledge of bankruptcy law, the court found that plaintiffs had established that debtor's failure to fully disclose assets was knowing and fraudulent, and debtor's discharge was denied. | |
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Joseph v. Stone (In re Stone) (Internal Ref: Opinion 264) |
Sep-21-1988 APPEAL 91 B.R. 589 (D.Utah) |
84PC-0988 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
Plaintiffs, who were all limited partners in a partnership in which debtor was the general partner, filed an adversary complaint alleging non-dischargeability of their claims against debtor, which the bankruptcy court dismissed. On appeal, the district court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs had failed to meet the burden of proving their claims under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4). Specifically, the district court determined that plaintiffs had failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that debtor's statements that induced them to invest in the partnership satisfied the elements of § 523(a)(2)(A), or that debtor was a "fiduciary" within the meaning of § 523(a)(4). | |
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Cottonwood Leasing v. Cossey (In re Cossey) (Internal Ref: Opinion 263) |
Sep-6-1988 APPEAL Unpublished |
86PC-0408 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
Plaintiff leased tanning equipment to debtors, and the lease was secured by both the equipment and debtors' home. Debtors filed a chapter 13 petition and submitted a plan providing that the equipment would be surrendered to plaintiff, and that any deficiency would become an unsecured claim, the amount of which would be determined at the confirmation hearing. Prior to confirmation, debtors returned the leased equipment to plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a proof of claim for the full amount owed under the lease, inadvertently listing its claim as unsecured. No reduction for the value of the returned equipment was made. Debtors did not object to the proof of claim, and plaintiff did not attend the confirmation hearing. The order confirming the plan provided that surrender of the equipment fully satisfied plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff filed an action to set aside the confirmation order and to modify the plan to reflect it as a secured creditor. The bankruptcy court granted debtors' motion to dismiss, and plaintiff appealed. The district court affirmed on the ground that plaintiff's lien had been satisfied, but specifically rejected the bankruptcy court's position that an order of confirmation could avoid an otherwise valid lien by operation of law. The court considered the bankruptcy court's ruling to implicitly value the surrendered equipment as equal to the value of plaintiff's claim, and concluded that plaintiff, by its failures to object to the plan, appeal the order confirming the plan, or argue on appeal that the plan did not satisfy the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5), was estopped from asserting that surrender of the equipment did not fully satisfy its claim. | |
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Bryant v. Straup (In re Straup) (Internal Ref: Opinion 262) |
Aug-22-1988 APPEAL Unpublished |
85PA-1419 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
Plaintiff had a pending state court action against debtor in which she alleged that debtor had killed her husband by driving while intoxicated. Debtor's default had been entered in the state court action, and a motion to enter a default judgment had been filed and argued, but further proceedings were stayed by the filing of debtor's bankruptcy petition. Plaintiff filed an adversary complaint in the bankruptcy, alleging that the debt owed her by debtor was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9). Plaintiff's motion for relief from stay to allow entry of a default judgment by the state court was denied by the bankruptcy court, as was her motion for partial summary judgment in the adversary action. The bankruptcy court dismissed plaintiff's case so she could appeal. Without a transcript of the bankruptcy court hearing, the district court assumed that summary judgment had been denied because plaintiff had no judgment and, therefore, could not make a claim pursuant to § 523(a)(9). The district court concluded that judgments based on drunk driving accidents could be entered postpetition, and that the bankruptcy court erred by denying plaintiff's motion for relief from stay. The district court instructed the bankruptcy court to allow plaintiff to liquidate her claim and seek a judgment in the district court action and, thereafter, to dispose of her dischargeability claim. | |
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Merrill v. Nelson Family Trust (In re UCH) (Internal Ref: Opinion 261) |
Aug-15-1988 APPEAL Unpublished |
83PA-1087 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
The bankruptcy court granted judgment in favor of chapter 11 trustee, concluding that debtors had made several preferential and fraudulent transfers to defendant. The sole issue on appeal was whether defendant's investments in a diamond and gold exchange should be considered value given to debtor clearinghouses, based on identity of interest between the exchange and debtors. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment, concluding that there was no evidence that investments in the exchange constituted value and consideration for transfers made by debtor clearinghouses. | |
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Rupp v. Codale Elec. Supply, Inc. (In re Henningsen) (Internal Ref: Opinion 260) |
Aug-15-1988 APPEAL Unpublished |
85PA-0099 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
Defendant, a wholesale supplier to debtor, appealed a bankruptcy court judgment granting chapter 7 trustee's claim that payments made by debtor to defendant were preferences under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). On appeal, the district court considered defendant's arguments that various payments made to it were excepted from § 547(b) preference treatment by § 547(c)(1), (2), and (4). Finding that none of the exceptions applied, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court judgment. | |
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Main Hurdman v. Anderson (In re Vasilacopulos) (Internal Ref: Opinion 259) |
Aug-12-1988 APPEAL Unpublished See 276.pdf |
84PC-1101 |
U.S. District Court, Utah |
Defendants appealed the bankruptcy court's order that trustee could recover the amounts debtor paid to defendants that exceeded their deposits with debtor, plus interest, as fraudulent conveyances under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2). The district court affirmed, concluding that defendants had failed to establish that the bankruptcy court's finding that debtor's operation was a "Ponzi scheme" was clearly erroneous. |
