The matter before the court was debtor's motion opposing tax liens filed by the Internal Revenue Service on debtor's property. By filing tax liens, the United States employed a process intended to collect or recover money or property. At issue is whether the filing of the liens was to collect a debt of the debtor. The tax liens on debtor's property were premised on the United States' theory that debtor is the "nominee, alter ego, transferee or agent" of Philip S. Fry, the vice president of debtor. Under any of these theories, the United States would be a contingent creditor of the debtor and, therefore, bound by the court's confirmation order, the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1141, and the 11 U.S.C. § 524 injunction. Any pre-confirmation equitable interest that Fry may have had in the debtor was extinguished by the bankruptcy confirmation process. Fry's undisputed testimony was that he does not own the debtor and holds no ownership interest in the debtor's real property. Therefore, the court ordered the United States to release each of the tax liens encumbering debtor's property within ten days.